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CURING THE MASS TORT SETTLEMENT 
MALAISE 
Noah Smith-Drelich*  
          To settle the thousands of claims arising from the defective 
painkiller Vioxx, Merck Pharmaceuticals brokered an agreement, not 
with the Vioxx plaintiffs but with their lawyers. This agreement required 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers to recommend settlement to all of their clients 
and to withdraw if any of those clients declined: plaintiffs’ lawyers 
could either settle all of their claims or none. Through this unusual 
arrangement, made without the involvement of the plaintiffs and outside 
of any formal judicial supervision, Merck was able to craft a favorable 
settlement group that mimicked a Rule 23 class. 
          This Article explores the Vioxx Agreement as but the first 
consequence of the Supreme Court’s restrictive mass tort class 
certification jurisprudence. Starting with Amchem Products, Inc. v. 
Windsor and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the Court has repeatedly 
disapproved of lower courts’ broad readings of Rule 23 and denied 
mass tort class certification—even where justice appears to demand a 
class action. Now, with so little flexibility in Rule 23’s requirements, 
few mass tort plaintiffs can hope to file suit as a Rule 23 class. 
          By removing a crucial tool for mass tort litigators, the Supreme 
Court has begun to push the resolution of mass torts out of the formal 
judicial system and into private contractual arrangements like the 
Vioxx Agreement. Although agreements like this may appear to be an 
adequate replacement for Rule 23 actions, they are far from it. Placing 
a substantial proportion of group litigation outside of a judicially 
controlled framework will lead to a fundamental shift in the carefully 
drawn balance between the interests of plaintiffs, plaintiffs’ lawyers, 
defendants, and society. Defendants will benefit from the ability to craft 
 
 *  Noah Smith-Drelich is a graduate of Stanford Law School and spent the last year 
clerking on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. He is currently clerking on a federal district court. 
Thanks are due to the Honorable Vaughn R. Walker and the Honorable Jay S. Bybee, Professors 
Janet Alexander, Howard Erichson, and Nora Engstrom, and Andrew Prout, Maggie McKinley, 
Julie Slater, and Harker Rhodes, IV for their enormous help in the writing of this Article. 
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desirable settlement classes since plaintiffs’ lawyers will face the choice 
between maximizing their clients’ interests or their own gains—all 
without effective judicial oversight. Plaintiffs, and ultimately society, 
will bear the brunt of the changes brought about by replacing Rule 23 
settlements with agreements like the Vioxx Agreement, as unjust 
settlements and systemic under-deterrence of future negligence will 
result. 
          Previous scholarship has focused on either the ethical problems 
inherent in the Vioxx Agreement or the difficulties that prospective mass 
tort classes now face in seeking class certification. This Article analyzes 
these issues together and proposes that a proliferation of “Vioxx 
Agreements” is both inevitable and undesirable. This Article then 
presents a solution to this overlooked, but substantial, emerging 
problem: much of the deterrence value inherent in group litigation may 
be preserved in private settlements by aggressively sanctioning 
plaintiffs’ lawyers for even minor ethical violations in the context of 
Vioxx Agreements. Rule 23 is carefully crafted to prevent abuses of 
mass adjudication, and may therefore effectively guide regulators in 
sanctioning those abuses most harmful to plaintiffs and society. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the mid-1990s, obese and overweight Americans flocked to 
Fen-Phen, the newest miracle cure for the love handle. Fen-Phen 
promised what not even the traditional remedies of diet and exercise 
could deliver: an average of thirty pounds of rapid weight loss.1 An 
estimated six million Americans took Fen-Phen between 1992 and 
1997, and approximately eighteen million prescriptions were written 
in 1996 alone.2 Tragically, weight loss was only the second most 
significant effect of Fen-Phen on the human body: fully one-third of 
Fen-Phen’s patients developed damaged heart valves, a potentially 
life-threatening health complication.3 Fen-Phen was pulled from the 
market in 1997 and a flood of litigation quickly followed.4 The 
manufacturers and distributors of Fen-Phen were repeatedly drawn 
into court; 50,000 Fen-Phen claims would be eventually filed.5 The 
potential burden of this litigation was crippling, not only for 
defendants, but for the judicial system, which was not equipped to 
handle cases on this scale.  
Many things must go wrong for a mass tort such as the Fen-Phen 
disaster to occur: regulatory fail-safes must fail, medical knowledge 
must come up short, and companies must gamble with the health and 
safety of their customers. Tort law can powerfully deter this last, but 
arguably most significant, factor in mass torts. Companies will 
design safer products, use more care in production lines, and better 
publicize what unavoidable risks are associated with their goods 
when tort awards and settlements increase the cost of risky practices. 
For tort law to accomplish this goal, however, tort victims must 
 
 1. See Gina Kolata, How Fen-Phen, a Diet ‘Miracle,’ Rose and Fell, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 23, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/23/science/how-fen-phen-a-diet-miracle-rose 
-and-fell.html; Brad Walters, 5 Things You Need to Know About Fen-Phen, LIVESTRONG.COM 
(Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.livestrong.com/article/4811-need-fen-phen/. Fen-Phen boasted a 
weight-loss rate three times that of diet and exercise, and twice that of even other diet drugs. Id. 
 2. Gale White, What’s the “Skinny” on Fen-Phen, FINDLAW (Mar. 3, 2008), 
http://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/what-s-the-skinny-on-fen-phen.html. 
 3. Kolata, supra note 1. 
 4. Some litigation preceded the removal of Fen-Phen from the market. See ALICIA MUNDY, 
DISPENSING WITH THE TRUTH: THE VICTIMS, THE DRUG COMPANIES, AND THE DRAMATIC 
STORY BEHIND THE BATTLE OVER FEN-PHEN (2001). 
 5. Walters, supra note 1.  
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actually sue. Sophisticated companies will recognize when certain 
categories of victims do not seek legal remedy for their injury, and 
will therefore be under-deterred with respect to such victims. Victims 
of mass torts represent one such potential group: because causation, 
liability, and damages are often particularly difficult and expensive 
to prove in the context of mass torts, mass tort victims rarely 
instigate individual lawsuits.6 
Rule 23 changed this, permitting the consolidation of small 
claims in class actions, and, therefore, broadening the reach of tort 
justice to include plaintiffs who, individually, do not have viable 
claims.7 This is far from the extent of Rule 23’s benefits, however. 
Rule 23 is carefully calibrated to balance the interests of plaintiffs, 
defendants, and society as a whole. Rule 23 provides plaintiffs a path 
to cost-effective recovery for their injuries, while adding a layer of 
protection from unscrupulous attorneys who do not act in the 
plaintiffs’ best interests.8 Rule 23 promises defendants a path to 
relief from the seemingly unpredictable and unlimited liability 
associated with individually litigated mass tort claims, as well as 
 
 6. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury 
Litigation: A Socio-Legal-Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 968 (1991) (noting that “[n]o claim 
in a mass tort litigation will have value until plaintiffs are able to establish causation, liability and 
damages”). This Article uses the term “mass tort” to refer to mass personal injury torts: instances 
in which the negligent behavior of a small number of defendants has physically injured many 
parties. Such accidents may often be composed of toxic tort, products liability, or failure-to-warn 
claims. “Mass torts” of this nature may be distinguished from antitrust, security, or workplace-
discrimination mass litigation, where a financial injury has occurred. 
 7. Rule 23 may not even go far enough. For the argument that the private incentives to 
litigate in a class are often inadequate to achieve the desired social benefits, see John Coffee, Jr., 
Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private 
Enforcement of the Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986). 
 8. This Article makes a number of assumptions: that plaintiffs generally have little 
information and are therefore largely at the mercy of their lawyers; that plaintiffs’ lawyers are 
economic actors, motivated by primarily financial ends; and that the threat of tort liability can act 
as a deterrent. Coffee, Kalven, Rosenfield, Rosenberg, and others explore these assumptions in 
more depth. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: 
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in Large Class Actions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987); Harry 
Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 684 (1941); John Leubsdorf, Co-Opting the Class Action, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1222, 1226 
(1995); Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney Role in Class Actions and 
Derivative Suits: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1991); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective 
Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts]; David 
Rosenberg, The Casual Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort 
System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984).  
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from the cost of defending a multitude of separate lawsuits. And by 
allowing even the smallest individual injuries to be litigated, the Rule 
provides substantial deterrence while sparing society from the 
enormous cost of the flood of individual claims that inevitably follow 
from a mass tort. Rule 23’s consolidation of mass torts benefits 
plaintiffs, defendants, and society alike.9 
Following the Supreme Court’s strict reading of Rule 23 starting 
with Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor10 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard 
Corp.,11 however, class actions are no longer viable in the mass tort 
context: neither society’s need for the mass adjudication of mass 
torts nor the practical difficulty most mass tort plaintiffs face in 
satisfying Rule 23(a) can justify courts’ relaxation of Congress’s 
class certification requirements.12 By removing a crucial tool for 
mass tort litigators, Amchem and Ortiz have begun to push the 
resolution of mass torts almost entirely out of the formal judicial 
system and into private contractual arrangements. One such 
arrangement is the recent Vioxx Agreement, a creatively structured 
non-class aggregate settlement that required lawyers to recommend 
the deal to their clients and to withdraw from the Agreement if any 
of their clients declined.13 This consequence of Amchem and Ortiz 
has received little scholarly attention.14 Yet, if left unchecked, it will 
 
 9. Put more precisely, Rule 23 carries potential for a win-win. Much scholarship has been 
devoted to discussing Rule 23’s shortcomings. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL 
GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 253 (1987) (criticizing the mandatory 
nature of (b)(2) class actions because it is “more likely than in the (b)(3) cases that the interests of 
the group’s members will conflict and will be least amenable to abstract assessment”); Allan 
Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvibility”: A New Approach to Regulating Class Actions, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1023 (2005) (noting “diversity among the circumstances of individual 
class members and judicial reactions to that diversity” as “overlooked source[s] of controversial 
shortcomings in the class action device”); John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—
What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS C. L. REV. 323 (2005) (cataloguing a number of objections to 
Rule 23).  
 10. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 11. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 12. For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part II.B. 
 13. For a more detailed discussion of the Agreement, see infra Part III. 
 14. The impacts of Amchem and Ortiz on non-class aggregate settlements and the tort 
deterrence equation have been addressed only tangentially in the literature. See, e.g., Deborah R. 
Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation after Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1899 
(2002) [hereinafter Hensler, As Time Goes By] (examining whether Amchem and Ortiz “have 
achieved the aims the objectors to the settlements sought” in the asbestos context); Deborah R. 
Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung? The Future of Mass Toxic Torts, 26 REV. LITIG. 883 (2007) 
(describing how mass toxic tort litigation has evolved to include more lawyers, fewer settlements, 
and diminished “bet the company” risks for defendants); Deborah R. Hensler, The Future of Mass 
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significantly change the tort deterrence equation. Although at first 
the terms of these private agreements may largely mirror, in 
appearance, the terms of class action settlements, the removal of 
mass tort settlements from the judicial system will deprive plaintiffs 
of the security that Rule 23 provides.15 Without the threat of class 
certification, non-class aggregate settlements will become further and 
further removed from the balance and protections that Rule 23’s 
structure provides. Judges may still be involved in some capacity, if 
only to provide parties to the settlement with a modicum of 
legitimacy, but left to the free market, the shift to private settlement 
agreements will ultimately benefit defendants the most. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II discusses how mass 
litigation has evolved to become an important tool for resolving mass 
torts, and analyzes how Rule 23’s construction carefully balances the 
competing interests brought into play by mass adjudication. Part III 
describes how, despite this careful legislative balancing, the judiciary 
 
Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
306 (2011) (using, as its example of the future of mass litigation, the 2005 Dutch Act on the 
Collective Settlement of Mass Claims, an administrative solution); Samuel Issacharoff, Shocked: 
Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation after Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925 
(2001) (exploring the consequences of Amchem and Ortiz through a theoretical lens); Francis E. 
McGovern, Settlement of Mass Torts in a Federal System, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 871, 884 
(2001) (anticipating, in a single short paragraph, the creation of class action surrogates like the 
Vioxx Agreement in the aftermath of Amchem and Ortiz, but providing no discussion of the 
practical or normative consequences of such surrogates); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
The Quasi-Class Method of Managing Multidistrict Litigations: Problems and a Proposal 
(N.Y.U. Law and Economics, Working Paper, 2009), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi 
/viewcontent.cgi?article=1178&context=nyu_lewp (analyzing the structural possibilities and 
consequences of MDLs, including the Vioxx MDL); Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of 
Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2009) (proposing a “do no harm” alternative to the 
“identity-of-interests” requirement from Amchem); cf. JENNY STEEL & WILLEM H. VAN BOOM, 
MASS JUSTICE: CHALLENGES OF REPRESENTATION AND DISTRIBUTION (2011) (offering 
restrained praise for the Vioxx Agreement’s hybrid approach); Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin 
C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265 (2010) (exploring the ethical 
issues of the Vioxx Agreement); Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing 
Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 979 (2010) (describing the ethical problems associated with “all-
or-nothing settlements,” a category that includes the Vioxx Agreement).  
 15. For a discussion of the importance of Rule 23’s protections, see the Supreme Court’s 
recent Rule 23 jurisprudence. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 
(2011); Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 858; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621. In practice, however, the security 
provided by Rule 23 may not be adequate to fully protect plaintiffs. See generally Robert H. 
Klonoff, The Judiciary’s Flawed Application of Rule 23’s “Adequacy of Representation” 
Requirement, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 671 (2004) (analyzing shortcomings in the judiciary’s 
application of Rule 23(a)(4)). This Article asserts that those protections offered in its absence will 
be even less effective. 
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significantly broadened Rule 23’s reach in response to the mass torts 
of the 1980s and 1990s, ultimately leading the Supreme Court to 
return Rule 23 to its pre-mass torts construction in Amchem and 
Ortiz. Part IV discusses how Amchem and Ortiz’s restriction on class 
certification has spurred plaintiffs and defendants to seek resolution 
of mass torts outside of a judicially controlled framework,16 and how 
this shift towards extra-judicial resolution will ultimately benefit 
defendants and lead to under-deterrence. Finally, Part V concludes 
with a novel, and counter-intuitive, solution: jurisdictions can attain 
near-optimal mass tort deterrence, even in the absence of permissive 
class certification, by aggressively sanctioning plaintiffs’ attorneys 
who do not act in the best interests of their clients when settling class 
settlements outside of Rule 23’s protections. 
II.  THE APPEAL OF GROUP LITIGATION,  
FROM THE MEDIEVAL TO THE MODERN 
This Article begins by exploring the many advantages provided 
by Rule 23 in the context of group litigation. This discussion is 
integral to understanding why agreements similar to the Vioxx 
Agreement are likely to propagate in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s ever-more-limiting Rule 23 jurisprudence. But it also shows 
why such extrajudicial agreements are so dangerous. Rule 23 is 
carefully calibrated to balance the interests of plaintiffs, plaintiffs’ 
lawyers, defendants, and society in group litigation. 
A.  A Medieval Tool Matures 
Group litigation has been a part of the Anglo legal system since 
the thirteenth century.17 This unusual judicial instrument first arose 
as an administrability tool of the nobility. Executing a legal judgment 
against an entire community was far easier for medieval monarchs 
than attempting to secure and enforce many individual judgments.18 
Difficulties with administration, communication, and transportation 
 
 16. At least one settlement has already made use of the Vioxx Agreement’s unusual 
structure: the GM Rice settlement reached in 2011. See GMB Settlement Agreement, GM RICE 
SETTLEMENT CLAIMS ADMIN. WEBSITE, http://gmricesettlement.com/BY_Un-secure/MDL 
_Settlement_Agreement.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2014). 
 17. Yeazell, supra note 9. 
 18. Id. 
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forced early English sovereigns to regularly turn to group litigation 
for governance throughout much of the late Middle Ages.19 
Centuries later, group litigation retains its salience. Class 
actions, the contemporary manifestation of this ancient device, are 
useful in a wide range of contexts, including the resolution of mass 
accidents.20 As the legal system developed, group litigation ceased to 
be used by the government: the modern administrative state assumed 
much of the role previously fulfilled by group litigation. Yet, 
agencies have proven ill-equipped to handle the overwhelming task 
of investigating and prosecuting safety issues, instead relying heavily 
on the research produced by potential defendants to determine 
whether products are safe for the marketplace.21 
Thus, the ancient prosecutorial mantle of group litigation has 
been passed to plaintiffs’ lawyers, who, as a result, are alternatively 
lauded as “private attorneys general”22 and vilified as “ambulance 
chasers.” This seeming contradiction stems, in large part, from 
plaintiffs’ lawyers’ unique funding model. Rather than billing by the 
hour or even by the lawsuit, plaintiffs’ lawyers typically take a fixed 
percentage of any recovery or settlement—30 or 35 percent is 
 
 19. Id. at 82–86. 
 20. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1350 (1995) (noting that “[d]efendants have not only adopted the class 
action as their preferred means of resolving their mass tort liabilities, but have also actually begun 
to solicit plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring such class actions (as a condition of settling other pending 
litigation between them)”); see also David Crump, What Really Happens During Class 
Certification? A Primer for the First-Time Defense Attorney, 10 REV. LITIG. 1, 8–9 (1990). One 
example of this is the class action filed over the defective Bjork-Shiley heart valve, which was 
brought originally as a nationwide class action, but extended to a global class action on 
defendants’ insistence. Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 154–55 (S.D. Ohio 1992), appeal 
dismissed, 995 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1993); Michael Schachner, Global Settlements Draw Praise, 
Scorn, BUS. INS., Oct. 10, 1994, at 1.  
 21. A recent study shows that agencies, such as the FDA, can only handle a small percentage 
of possible claims brought to them and are woefully understaffed. See REPORT OF THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCI. & TECH., FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK (2007), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/2007-4329b_02_01_fda%20report%20on 
%20science%20and%20technology.pdf. 
 22. Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action 
and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179 (2001). Professor Hensler 
notes that although this characterization may ascribe more altruism to plaintiffs’ lawyers than 
what is warranted, the impact of lawsuits in such contexts is to internalize negative societal 
externalities—regardless of whether a plaintiff’s lawyer acts out of a motivation to do good or to 
make money. Id. 
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standard for suits brought individually.23 This creates strong 
incentives for plaintiffs’ lawyers to not merely litigate, but to seek 
out and investigate potential mass torts since the lucrative prize of a 
class action judgment far outweighs even substantial investigative 
and litigation costs.24 Consequently, plaintiffs’ lawyers, wielding the 
threat of a large lawsuit, have become a powerful arbiter of safety in 
modern society. 
Not all of the incentives that contingency fees create are 
positive, however. The contingency fee-funding model means that 
plaintiffs’ lawyers must balance the prospective cost of litigation 
against the possibility of recovery. This creates a financial incentive 
for plaintiffs’ lawyers to accept early settlement offers, which 
provide lawyers with a guaranteed payment without the cost or risk 
of trial. Moreover, plaintiffs who seek non-financial remedies may 
find their lawyers less than amenable to such arrangements. Because 
victims of mass torts are typically neither sophisticated nor repeat 
legal players, they litigate at the mercy of their lawyers, and when 
the interests of plaintiffs’ lawyers are not aligned with those of the 
plaintiffs that they represent, it is too often the plaintiffs whose 
interests are harmed. 
B.  The Broad Appeal of Group Litigation 
One other challenge that contingency fee litigation presents is 
that the prospective financial award of a settlement or judgment must 
be sufficient to justify the time and cost of litigation for the 
plaintiffs’ lawyer. Individual victims of mass torts, however, often 
 
 23. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Attorney Advertising and the Contingency Fee Cost 
Paradox, 65 STAN. L. REV. 633 (2013); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805 (2011); see also David Giacalone, Contingency Fees (Pt. 3): Do 
“Standard” Fees Exist?, F/K/A . . . THE ARCHIVES (Apr. 8, 2006, 2:34 AM), http://blogs.law 
.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/contingency-fees-pt-3-do-standard-fees-exist/. Mass litigators generally 
take smaller percentages of the recovery, but due to the large size of mass judgments, the reward 
of representing a class of plaintiffs can be even more disproportionate in relation to the time and 
expense of litigation.  
 24. This is not to say that all plaintiffs’ lawyers are purely economic agents; plaintiffs’ 
lawyers are also influenced by non-economic external factors such as “moral duties, altruism, or 
virtue.” Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Response, Procedural Adequacy, 88 TEX. L. REV. 55, 58 
(2010). For the purposes of exploring Amchem, Ortiz, and the Vioxx Agreement, however, this 
Article will treat plaintiffs’ lawyers as predominantly economically motivated. To the extent that 
plaintiffs’ lawyers are actually driven by other motives, the effects described throughout this 
Article will be diminished. 
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have suffered only speculative injury, and require extensive 
discovery and expert testimony to develop their claims; many 
justiciable mass tort injuries are of an uncertain value, are expensive 
to litigate, and are therefore unattractive to plaintiffs’ lawyers.25 
Although individual mass tort claims tend to be far from 
insignificant, few plaintiffs’ lawyers will spend hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in discovery, expert witness, and time costs to 
secure a judgment that may count only in the tens of thousands of 
dollars.26 Even cases with relatively certain judgments will be 
refused by lawyers when the value of recovery is too small to 
sufficiently cover the costs incurred in securing that recovery.27 
Modern group litigation seeks to address this challenge. Class 
action lawsuits provide a vehicle for making the litigation of small 
claims viable. By aggregating numerous small claims into a single 
larger claim, class actions multiply the potential reward of litigation 
without similarly multiplying the costs. Many potential mass tort 
plaintiffs thus have no workable path to recovery outside of group 
litigation.28 
 
 25. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 884 (“Although some plaintiffs in a mass tort action may 
have suffered disproportionately large injuries and thus have a sufficient stake in the action to 
justify expending funds to monitor the attorney, most do not.”); Rosenberg, Class Actions for 
Mass Torts, supra note 8, at 563 (describing mass torts as “exceedingly, if not prohibitively, 
expensive to litigate”); see also RAND CORP., Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation 
(1995), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9021/index1.html (noting that 
issues such as interdependent values, difficulty proving causation, and future injury lower the 
value of many mass-tort injuries to plaintiffs’ lawyers). 
 26. The exception to this rule comes when plaintiffs use litigation as a strategic business 
tool, as is common in the intellectual property arena. Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants 
Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2012), https://journals.law.stanford.edu/stanford 
-technology-law-review/online/giants-among-us (describing the rise of patent mass aggregators 
and the use of patents both defensively and offensively as a business tool). 
 27. Cf. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 
1486 (2009) (describing and analyzing the rise of “settlement mills”: firms that specialize in a 
high-volume practice of low-risk cases). 
 28. For examples and discussions of this, see, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant 
Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Adjudicating 
Asbestos Insurance Liability: Alternatives to Contract Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV. 739 (1984); 
Anne Hardiman, Toxic Torts and Chapter 11 Reorganization: The Problem of Future Claims, 38 
VAND. L. REV. 1369, 1395–96 (1985); Don V. Jernberg, Insurance for Environmental and Toxic 
Risks: Basic Analysis of the Gap Between Liability and Coverage, 34 FED’N INS. COUNS. Q. 123 
(1984). This same obstacle to recovery may apply in “diminished recovery cases.” See, e.g., 
Carlson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287, 289 (4th Cir. 1989); Garza v. Sporting Goods 
Properties, Inc., No. CIV. A. SA–93–CA–108, 1996 WL 56247 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 1996); Am. 
Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 526, 527–28 (Ct. App. 1995); Anthony v. 
Kelsey-Hayes Co., 102 Cal. Rptr. 113 (Ct. App. 1972). On the other hand, many mass torts—
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Modern class actions retain the efficiency, administrability, and 
finality advantages that justified their precursors and, thus, are not 
merely a device used by plaintiffs, but one that is often preferred by 
defendants.29 First, class actions present an efficient alternative to 
individual suits. Class action defendants seek to control the costs of 
their mistakes, which means limiting not merely their legal liability 
but the price of being sued. The expense of litigation defense has 
soared over the past century, as hourly billable rates have steadily 
grown. What was once an incidental cost of doing business has 
become a multi-billion dollar industry.30 In fact, a 1985 RAND 
Institute for Civil Justice study revealed that the amount of the 
recovery now makes up less than half of the total cost of litigation.31 
Because defense lawyers typically bill by the hour, defendants have a 
significant monetary incentive to resolve litigation quickly. The 
substantial costs of expert witnesses and discovery only heighten the 
financial impact of taking a personal injury case to trial. Second, 
class actions are more administrable than individual lawsuits. 
Hundreds of suits requiring thousands of lawyers and experts are 
neither quick nor cheap to resolve. Although a single class action 
lawsuit may nevertheless be more difficult and expensive to litigate 
than any one individual lawsuit, class actions have substantially 
 
such as in the asbestos context—cause high value injuries that are attractive to plaintiffs’ lawyers 
even as individual cases. See, e.g., Marianna S. Smith, Resolving Asbestos Claims: The Manville 
Personal Injury Settlement Trust, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27 (1990). 
 29. See, e.g., HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 7509 (4th ed. 1977); 
Steven M. Morgan, Finality in Litigation, 1, available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/96215790 
/Finality-in-Litigation (describing the many reasons why “[u]sing the class action in this fashion 
could be advantageous for a Defendant,” including the facts that “it would involve a single, 
unified adjudication, would prevent relitigation of the same issues, would close-off avenues for 
new, subsequent Plaintiffs, and a settlement with a representative party could bind a whole class 
of affected parties”). It is also worth noting that classes of defendants are still permitted under 
Rule 23. They now comprise, however, only a small fraction of all class actions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(a) (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of 
all members . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also David E. Rigney, Annotation, Permissibility of 
Action Against a Class of Defendants Under Rule 23(b)(2) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
85 A.L.R. FED. 263 (1987). 
 30. Joni Hersch & Kip Viscusi, Tort Liability Litigation Costs for Commercial Claims, 9 
AM. LAW ECON. REV. 330 (2007). 
 31. JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND CORP., COSTS AND COMPENSATION 
PAID IN TORT LITIGATION (1986), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs 
/reports/2006/R3391.pdf (explaining that 37 percent of the cost of litigation is legal and expense 
fees, 15 percent is lost time value, and 2 percent is court costs. The remaining 46 percent in 1985 
was the payment made to plaintiffs, whether via settlement or court-ordered award). 
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lower litigation expenses for defendants than the alternative of 
countless individual suits. Third, class actions offer defendants the 
possibility of finality. Because litigation generates significant bad 
publicity and ill will for defendants, defendants often want nothing 
more than to put lawsuits—especially class action lawsuits—behind 
them.32 The desire to achieve finality in litigation is more than 
publicity-based, however; corporations must be able to plan for the 
future and, thus, unpredictability in prospective litigation costs also 
takes a substantial toll. Class actions, which may bind absent 
plaintiffs in addition to present plaintiffs, provide defendants not 
only with a quick and efficient means of resolving lawsuits but with 
a degree of finality that would otherwise be impossible to ensure. 
The most significant advantage provided by group litigation, 
however, may be to society. The societal cost of mass torts—whether 
counted in pain and suffering, lost earnings potential, or decreased 
consumer trust—is enormous. Privately adjudicating such losses 
through class action lawsuits provides for closer-to-optimal levels of 
deterrence. From a law and economics standpoint, optimal deterrence 
is achieved when tort law fully internalizes the cost of the tort—for 
example when the marginal cost of an extra dollar of precaution 
equals the marginal benefit of an extra dollar of accident reduction.33 
Prospective defendants will take cost-justified precautions in 
response to group litigation, leading to a safer, healthier, and happier 
society. Where administrative agencies cannot or will not act, class 
actions nevertheless provide a market-driven deterrence alternative 
without regard to the size of individual plaintiffs’ claims. Moreover, 
group litigation relieves the already overworked court system from 
the burden of trying thousands, or tens of thousands, of duplicative 
 
 32. James M. Anderson, Understanding Mass Tort Defendant Incentives for Confidential 
Settlements: Lessons from Bayer’s Cerivastatin Litigation Strategy (Rand Institute for Civil 
Justice, Working Paper No. WR-617-ICJ, 2008), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/working 
_papers/WR617.html (describing how Bayer’s reputational concern impacted the course of the 
cerivastatin litigation). 
 33. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic 
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 878–79 (1999) (discussing the concept of optimal deterrence, 
and noting “if a defendant will definitely be found liable for the harm for which he is responsible, 
the proper magnitude of damages is equal to the harm the defendant has caused”). As Professors 
Polinsky & Shavell recognize, tort law generally provides sub-optimal deterrence. Id. Therefore, 
one consequence of the class action structure increasing the viability of plaintiff claims—and 
therefore the likely cost of tortfeasing to potential defendants—is that deterrence is increased to 
closer-to-optimal levels. 
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cases. Consequently, class action lawsuits are a powerful tool for 
creating societal good through their promotion of judicial efficiency 
and their role in deterring societal harms.34 
The mutually beneficial nature of class actions may be at its 
greatest in the context of class action settlements. Class action 
settlements assure defendants a degree of finality that would 
otherwise be impossible to achieve with individual suits, as class 
settlements bind all members of a class who do not affirmatively opt-
out—all without the litigation costs of trial or appeal.35 For plaintiffs 
and plaintiffs’ lawyers, the aggregation of claims in group litigation 
significantly raises the financial stakes, and thus, the guarantee of 
even only a partial recovery will often prove attractive.36 Plaintiffs’ 
lawyers may therefore recoup a significant proportion of their 
contingency fees through settlement without having to underwrite the 
costs of trial or assume the risk of an unfavorable judgment.37 
Courts, in turn, also welcome settlements as a means of reducing the 
burdens that litigation places on an already overwhelmed judicial 
system. On the whole, class action settlements represent an 
apotheosis of efficiency; hundreds, if not thousands, of suits may be 
resolved in one fell swoop without the need for a complicated and 
lengthy trial. 
This is not to say that settlement has no disadvantages: the 
financial incentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers to settle can subvert the 
aims of justice, particularly in the class action context.38 The 
economics of group-settlement litigation, which often pit the 
interests of defendants and plaintiffs’ lawyers against the interests of 
plaintiffs and society, could upset tort law’s deterrence function. 
Although it is often defendants who instigate settlement talks, 
settlements are not commonly formed only from a defendant’s sense 
of obligation or guilt: settling is frequently a defendant’s best 
business decision. In such circumstances, defendants often seek to 
offer the smallest possible sum necessary to buy finality (taking into 
 
 34. RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH (5th ed. 2009). 
 35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 36. Unfortunately, this has created unfortunate incentives for plaintiffs’ lawyers to settle 
cases even when not in the best interest of their clients. See infra Part II. 
 37. Frances E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 59 B.U. L. REV. 659, 
663–64 (1989). 
 38. See infra Part II. 
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account the costs of monetary and nonmonetary damages). Plaintiffs, 
of course, need not accept defendants’ initial offers, and often do not. 
Through their lawyers, plaintiffs have a financial incentive to seek 
the highest settlement value that defendants are willing to agree to 
(taking into account, once again, the value of both monetary and 
nonmonetary damages). So long as plaintiffs’ lawyers fulfill this role 
and zealously advocate for their clients, settlements will remain 
widely used, wildly attractive, and an all-around good option for the 
resolution of mass torts.39 
It is when plaintiffs’ lawyers shirk in their duties as zealous 
advocates that this bargaining breaks down and settlements are no 
longer advantageous for plaintiffs or society. Plaintiffs, unlike 
defendants and plaintiffs’ lawyers, are usually not repeat players in 
litigation and thus are relatively ignorant as to what constitutes a 
good or fair settlement offer.40 This is known as the “agency cost 
problem.”41 As Professor Coffee outlines, this can lead to 
“sweetheart” settlements where plaintiffs lawyers urge plaintiffs to 
accept settlements that are far smaller than what plaintiffs’ claim is 
worth, in the hopes of avoiding the significant time required in trials 
and appeals.42 It is too often that trusting clients accept such sub-
optimal arrangements.43 
 
 39. See infra Part II; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (providing judicial oversight of Rule 23 
settlements). 
 40. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PSLRA]. PSLRA helps limit 
abuses of the litigation system in the securities context. As one of its many reforms, the PSLRA 
allows judges to decide the most adequate plaintiff in class actions and encourages greater 
judicial scrutiny of lawyer conflicts of interest. Id. 
 41. Coffee, supra note 8, at 885; see also Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 899–900 (2d Cir. 
1972); Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964); Andrew Rosenfield, An 
Empirical Test of Class-Action Settlement, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 114–17 (1976) (concluding 
that statistical analyses of class-action settlements indicate that settlements result in pecuniary 
gains to attorneys at the expense of the class). 
 42. Coffee, supra note 8 (describing, also, other problems that can arise from the plaintiffs’ 
lawyer-client relationship). These financial incentives can be so strong that Professor Coffee has 
commented that “it is more accurate to describe the plaintiff’s attorney as an independent 
entrepreneur than as an agent of the client.” Id. at 882–83. 
 43. See id. For example, a plaintiff may be offered a settlement of $30,000 for a claim likely 
to yield a $100,000 recovery through trial. Assuming the plaintiff’s lawyer was working on a 
standard one-third contingency fee, this would entail a $10,000 payment to the lawyer for her 
time spent securing the settlement or a $33,000 payment for her time spent securing a trial 
judgment. If the settlement offer required five hours of work from the plaintiff’s lawyer, but a 
trial would require one hundred hours of work, the hourly benefits of settling ($2,000 per hour) 
far outweigh the hourly benefits of going to trial ($330 per hour). Even assuming that a favorable 
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The risk of financial cross-incentives diminishing plaintiffs’ 
quality of representation is greatest in the context of group 
litigation.44 Since the time and costs of trial, the threat and 
uncertainty of appeal, and the potential ultimate value of class 
actions tend to be far higher than in individual lawsuits, plaintiffs’ 
lawyers have the greatest incentive to seek quick, cheap 
resolutions.45 Moreover, many plaintiffs do not expect a recovery 
sufficient to justify time or money spent monitoring their lawyers; 
though some plaintiffs suffer disproportionately large injuries and are 
therefore personally invested in the quality of their representation, it 
is not uncommon for a substantial proportion of mass tort class 
action plaintiffs to be, effectively, free riders.46 These issues are 
further compounded by two additional related factors: no market 
exists to regulate lawyer behavior, and because class action lawyers 
typically solicit clients (and not the other way around), principal 
preference plays a much smaller role than in typical agent-principal 
relationships.47 
Even those plaintiffs interested in monitoring their lawyers face 
difficulties in class actions where plaintiffs’ lawyers act on behalf of 
a significant number of plaintiffs whom they may never meet and, 
thus, are one step further removed from the interests of many of their 
clients. And because plaintiffs’ lawyers are typically paid on 
contingency, a plaintiff who seeks only an apology or a promise of 
changed behavior on the part of defendant may have difficulty 
finding any representation at all. Plaintiffs’ lawyers are not paid in 
apologies and may therefore persuade their clients that a small, sure, 
settlement value is preferable to the prospective relief desired by 
plaintiffs, even when it is not.48 The rewards of settlement, especially 
in the class action context, may be great—but so are the risks. 
 
trial judgment was all but assured, it would be financially rational, though not ethical, for the 
lawyer to urge her client to accept the settlement offer despite the fact that settlement makes little 
financial sense for a plaintiff in this situation. 
 44. See id. at 884. 
 45. Plaintiffs, similarly, are often sensitive to the significant investment of time and the 
inherent uncertainty involved in group litigation. As has been discussed, but nevertheless bears 
repeating, settlement often can be the optimal resolution of a class action. 
 46. Coffee, supra note 8, at 884. 
 47. Id. at 885–86. 
 48. This may be what happened in the proposed Ticketmaster settlement, where prospective 
class members were provided $1.50 credits towards future Ticketmaster purchases while their 
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C.  Group Litigation Codified 
Enter Rule 23. The contemporary evolution of group litigation 
was completed by the 1966 revisions to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure,49 which regulates the modern federal class 
action.50 The protections that Rule 23 provides for plaintiffs, 
defendants, and society as a whole are carefully constructed, and are 
critical to the successful resolution of mass accidents en masse. 
Crucially, the deterrence function of class actions depends on Rule 
23’s precise execution. Rule 23 may not operate perfectly to 
effectuate its goals but, as this section argues, its absence presents 
greater risks than does its presence. Rule 23 is not an empty 
procedural rule, and changing any of the safeguards integral to its 
structure will have serious consequences for the deterrence of 
potential mass tortfeasors. 
1.  Defining a Class Under Rule 23(a) 
Rule 23(a) sets forth the qualifications that a group must possess 
in order to be defined as a class.51 Because mass tort class actions 
provide more deterrence than individual lawsuits,52 a permissive 
reading of Rule 23(a) will result in additional classes being 
certified—and therefore in greater deterrence. On the other hand, a 
restrictive reading of Rule 23(a) will lead to fewer class certifications 
and less deterrence. 
 
attorneys won $16.5 million in legal fees. Andy Vuong, Judge Rejects Ticketmaster Settlement 
Offering $1.50 Coupons to Consumers, $16.5 Million to Attorneys, DENVER POST 
(Oct. 4, 2012, 11:22 AM), http://blogs.denverpost.com/techknowbytes/2012/10/04/judge-rejects 
-ticketmaster-settlement-offering-150-coupons-consumers-165-million-attorneys/6611/. The 
proposed settlement was rejected by the presiding judge. Id. 
 49. The 1966 revisions created the modern version of Rule 23. See Yeazell, supra note 9, at 
229; see also Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Plaintiffs’ Lawyer Reader 324 (Spring 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 50. States frequently have class action statutes as well, but this Article focuses on Rule 23, 
given its outsized influence on the modern class action. 
 51. Rule 23(a) reads, in its entirety: 
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties on behalf of all members only if: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses 
of the class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 52. See discussion supra note 33. 
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Rule 23(a) does not merely impact the deterrence function of 
class actions, however. This gatekeeper of class certification also 
ensures that the class action is both fair and justiciable. Although the 
scaled economy of group litigation is efficient, it is not without its 
costs: along with the benefits of grouping many individual claims 
comes the risk that justice may not be done. This tension—between 
optimal deterrence, and fairness and justiciability—is carefully 
balanced by Rule 23(a)’s specific provisions. 
Rule 23(a)’s first requirement—numerosity—ensures that the 
class action vehicle will only be used when a sufficient number of 
prospective plaintiffs have been injured such that individual lawsuits 
would overwhelm the courts and defendants, and joinder is 
impracticable.53 Because the class action format trades some degree 
of specificity for efficiency, the numerosity requirement prevents 
class certification in instances where defendants’, plaintiffs’, and 
society’s interest in efficiency does not outweigh the benefits of 
individual trials. Although permitting certification for less-numerous 
classes could increase the deterrence function of class actions 
(because more class actions will be certified), mass torts generally 
include a large number of mass tort victims. Enforcement of Rule 
23(a)’s numerosity requirement will therefore have little impact on 
mass tort deterrence: it will not generally be the case that a mass tort 
class action will not be certified because it fails to meet the 
numerosity requirement.54 
The second requirement—commonality—protects defendants by 
prohibiting suit where prospective plaintiffs’ claims are not 
sufficiently alike to be litigated as one claim.55 This ensures that 
class actions are both fair and justiciable. Rule 23(a)(2) also has 
 
 53. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring that “the class [be] so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable”). 
 54. For a recent discussion of the numerosity requirement, albeit in a slightly different 
context, see Julie Slater, Reaping the Benefits of Class Certification: How and When Should 
“Significant Proof” Be Required Post-Dukes?, BYU L. REV. 1259 (2011). 
 55. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (requiring that “there are questions of law or fact common to the 
class”); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2545 (2011) (insisting that the 
common question must be “of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which 
means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of 
each one of the claims in one stroke”). There is some disagreement as to whether Dukes changed 
or clarified Rule 23(a)(2). Compare Connor B., ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 278 F.R.D. 30, 33 (D. 
Mass. 2011) (noting that Dukes clarified the law), with M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 
832 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting that Dukes heightened the standard for commonality). 
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significant deterrence consequences, however, as a lenient 
application of the commonality requirement could lead to either 
over-deterrence or under-deterrence. For example, over-deterrence 
will result if plaintiffs are permitted to craft classes that include 
unlike claims, compelling defendants (who lose) to pay for the 
claims of class members whom they may not have wronged. And 
under-deterrence will result if defendants can influence class 
composition by crafting settlements that group a small number of 
strong claims with weaker claims that define the recovery. On the 
other hand, a too-strict application of the commonality requirement 
will also lead to sub-optimal deterrence; no two injuries are exactly 
identical, so requiring an unrealistic degree of commonality will 
discourage class actions.56 
The third provision of Rule 23(a) is typicality, which protects 
both defendants and prospective plaintiffs by ensuring that the 
named plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the class as a whole. 
Defendants should not be subjected to the aggregated claims of a 
weak class made strong by its named plaintiffs, and absent class 
members should not be bound by a judgment reached on facts that 
materially vary from their own.57 Because typicality serves 
defendants and plaintiffs alike, a more permissive interpretation of 
Rule 23(a)(3) may increase the unpredictability of class action 
judgments but may not influence deterrence in one way or the 
other.58 However, should either defendants or plaintiffs be 
systematically permitted to craft classes with strategically atypical 
named plaintiffs, rewards would become systematically skewed, and 
either under-deterrence or over-deterrence will result. 
Finally, Rule 23(a)(4)—adequacy of representation—provides 
the class with some assurance that the lead lawyers are competent to 
represent the interests of named and unnamed plaintiffs, and that 
there are no conflicts of interest inherent to the class. Plaintiffs in 
class actions may not even know that they are parties to a suit until 
they have been notified of a prospective settlement or judgment and, 
consequently, plaintiffs are especially vulnerable to unethical 
 
 56. See Slater, supra note 54. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Unpredictability may have its own impact on deterrence, but that is the subject for a 
different paper. 
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plaintiffs’ lawyers. Because the interests of plaintiffs and their 
attorneys often do not align in class actions, a more permissive 
interpretation of this requirement could interfere with the class 
action’s deterrence function: plaintiffs’ attorneys who inadequately 
represent the class may choose a modest private settlement over the 
possibility of a large public judgment (that would require an 
expensive trial), and will be less likely to seek non-monetary 
remedies because of the compensation structure of the contingency 
fee.59 More settlements and smaller remedies will result, as well as 
agreements that restrict publicity. The sum total of these effects will 
be sub-optimal deterrence. 
2.  Determining the Type of Class Under Rule 23(b) 
If a prospective class meets the Rule 23(a) requirements, a judge 
must then turn to Rule 23(b) to determine on what grounds the class 
may be certified. Judges have three options, each of which is 
carefully attuned to advancing important societal goals while 
preventing misuse of group litigation. Whereas Rule 23(a) defines 
the class being certified, Rule 23(b) limits the circumstances in 
which a class action may be used. Permitting class certification in 
circumstances other than those specifically delineated by 23(b) opens 
the door to the co-option of group litigation by self-interested 
parties.60 As with Rule 23(a) determinations, the deterrence value of 
class action lawsuits will be influenced by how broadly or 
restrictively courts apply Rule 23(b). 
a.  23(b)(1) Certification 
Rule 23(b)(1) permits class certification where “individual 
adjudication of the controversy would prejudice either the party 
opposing the class, (b)(1)(A), or the class members themselves, 
(b)(1)(B).”61 Thus, if a judge determines that “inconsistent or varying 
adjudications” will arise from individual suits, certification may be 
 
 59. See supra Part II.B. 
 60. It’s also possible that greater Rule 23(b) flexibility will lead to creative structures that 
allow more justice. But, as I will discuss, the incentives and structures that define mass-tort 
litigation will more likely drive non-Rule 23(b) settlements towards societally undesirable 
outcomes. See infra Part IV.B. 
 61. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); Zimmerman v. Bell, 800 F.2d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 1986). 
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granted under 23(b)(1)(A).62 Alternatively, Rule 23(b)(1)(B) permits 
class certification where individual judgments will, as a practical 
matter, preclude suit for other members of the class.63 This is 
commonly the case when individual claims made against a limited 
fund are likely to exhaust the fund before all claims are satisfied.64 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) classes have been very useful, and are most 
widely used within the context of the limited-fund class.65 Given the 
high number of individual claims typically brought in a mass tort 
class action—over 50,000 in the Fen-Phen litigation, for example66—
the chance of a defendant declaring bankruptcy before all suits have 
concluded is extraordinarily high. Therefore, if certification of a 
prospective 23(b)(1) lawsuit fails, it can have significant implications 
for the tort system’s administration of justice. Plaintiffs who file suit 
quickly will be more assured of recovery regardless of the relative 
merit of their claims, and plaintiffs whose injuries surface years later 
might be deprived of any hope of recovery. Bankruptcy is a powerful 
defense against slow-developing illnesses and will lead to a 
substantially diminished recovery, and therefore under-deterrence, 
for injuries with a delayed onset. Finally, any relaxation of 23(b)(1)’s 
 
 62. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A); see Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 
366–67 (1921); DAVID W. LOUISELL & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: 
STATE AND FEDERAL 719 (1962) (rephrasing this requirement as a consideration as to whether 
“the possibility exists that [the] actor might be called upon to act in inconsistent ways”).  
 63. See Cauble, 255 U.S. at 356; Waybright v. Columbian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 
885 (W.D. Tenn. 1939); cf. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288 (1853). For similar cases in the 
shareholders context, see Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961); Ames 
v. Mengel Co., 190 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1951); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 
1947); Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 17 F.R.D. 245 (E.D. Pa. 1954), aff’d, 230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 
1956); Goldberg v. Whittier Corp., 111 F. Supp. 382 (E.D. Mich. 1953); Speed v. Transamerica 
Corp., 100 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1951); Sobel v. Whittier Corp., 95 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Mich. 
1951), appeal dismissed, 195 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1952); Edgerton v. Armour & Co., 94 F. Supp. 
549 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Giesecke v. Denver Tramway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 957 (D. Del. 1949). 
Finally, similar cases also arise in breach of trusts by fiduciaries that affect a large class of 
beneficiaries. See, e.g., Citizens Banking Co. v. Monticello State Bank, 143 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 
1944); Redmond v. Commerce Trust Co., 144 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1944); Boesenberg v. Chi. Title 
& Trust Co., 128 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1942); cf. York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 
1944), rev’d on other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 64. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 105 (1966); cf. 
Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952). 
 65. Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1102 (2012). 
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) actions are relatively rare, due to the rule’s overlap with Rule 23(b)(2) actions. 
Id. at 1101; see also Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union v. Reagan, 509 F. Supp 1337 (D.D.C. 1981). 
 66. Fen-Phen Heart Valve Damage Lawsuit, LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM, http://www 
.lawyersandsettlements.com/lawsuit/fenphen.html#.U_yhrEsx_wJ (last updated Apr. 11, 2013). 
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opt-out provision will permit defendants to trap plaintiffs in a class 
action judgment or settlement that is not favorable to plaintiffs, 
leading to a lesser overall recovery and therefore to under-deterrence. 
b.  23(b)(2) Certification 
Rule 23(b)(2) permits class certification where plaintiffs seek 
injunctive relief applicable to the class as a whole. Unlike in 23(b)(3) 
classes, plaintiffs in 23(b)(2) classes are not permitted to opt out.67 
Traditionally, 23(b)(2) classes have been used most regularly in the 
context of civil rights lawsuits,68 although they are not limited to 
such cases.69 Injunctive relief may also be sought in the mass tort 
context where the damage—say, a toxic spill—is ongoing. 
Permitting plaintiffs to reap the benefits from a remedial injunction 
while opting out and seeking additional damages could lead to over-
deterrence; defendants would essentially face double punishment for 
their wrongs. 
c.  23(b)(3) Certification 
Finally, a judge may certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3) so long 
as common questions of law and fact “predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action 
is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.”70 Rule 23(b)(3) acts as a catch-all for 
 
 67. Rule 23(b)(1) classes are generally considered mandatory classes, but the Second Circuit 
has permitted Rule 23(b)(1)(B) opt-out at the discretion of district courts in a limited set of 
circumstances. See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001).  
 68. See, e.g., Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 58–59 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that Rule 
23(b)(2) “serves most frequently as the vehicle for civil rights actions and other institutional 
reform cases that receive class action treatment”); see also Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 
1963); Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1963); Brunson v. Bd. of Trs. of Sch. Dist. No. 
1, Clarendon City, S.C., 311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962); Green v. Sch. Bd. of Roanoke, Va., 304 
F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1962); Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of Memphis, 302 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1962); 
Mannings v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Hillsborough Cty., Fla., 277 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1960); 
Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957); Frasier v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of 
N.C., 134 F. Supp. 589 (M.D.N.C. 1955), aff’d sub nom. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of N.C. v. Frasier, 
350 U.S. 979 (U.S.N.C. 1956).  
 69. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. at 102 (describing 
how Rule 23(b)(2) may be used by a class of purchasers alleging a seller’s improper price fixing, 
or by patent licensees to test the legality of patent “tying” provisions). And, following Dukes, it is 
unclear how feasible Rule 23(b)(2) certification is in even the civil rights context. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (holding 5-4 that commonality requirement was not 
satisfied, and 9-0 that claims for backpay made certification under Rule 23(b)(2) inappropriate). 
 70. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  
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instances in which a class action is called for but does not fall under 
the specific circumstances described by (b)(1) or (b)(2). It requires 
that prospective class members be given notice as well as an 
opportunity to opt-out of the class. Although the latitude that Rule 
23(b)(3) grants to judges to certify classes is great, its predominance 
requirement is rigid. Therefore, even when “economies of time, 
effort, and expense,” or concerns about the uniformity of decisions, 
militate class certification, certification may only be granted where 
predominance exists; the class action format cannot be used 
pragmatically at the cost of compromising the rights of defendants or 
plaintiffs.71 
Permitting the certification of classes that do not meet Rule 
23(b)(3)’s requirements will open the door to a more pragmatic use 
of the class action. Although such pragmatic certification will 
increase the efficiency of the court system, it may do so at the cost of 
justice. For example, permitting certification where common 
questions of law and fact do not predominate will bind both plaintiffs 
and defendants to claims that substantially differ from those actually 
litigated at trial. Moreover, if Rule 23(b)(3) is robbed of its opt-out or 
notice provisions, it may lock plaintiffs into unfavorable decisions 
and lead to under-deterrence of future wrongdoing.72 The high bar 
for Rule 23(b)(3) certification implies a concern that group litigation 
is susceptible to abuse, especially outside of the Rules 23(b)(1) and 
(b)(2) context. 
3.  Protecting a Class Under Rule 23 
A number of Rule 23’s provisions expressly provide strict 
judicial oversight of the class action, from class certification, to 
settlement, to the final disbursement of the judgment. In particular, 
Rule 23 ensures adequate attorney representation of plaintiffs 
through Rules 23(a)(4),73 23(e)(2),74 23(g),75 and 23(h).76 Moreover, 
 
 71. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. at 102; see Miller 
v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 166 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1948); Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., Inc., 
144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944). 
 72. This is much less of a concern for Rule 23(b)(1) or (2) actions, given the set of 
circumstances to which they apply. 
 73. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (permitting class certification only where “the representative 
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”). 
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the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) adds an additional level of 
scrutiny; under CAFA, coupon settlements may be reviewed by an 
independent expert preceding judicial approval, and lawyers must 
take some of their payment in coupons.77  
Plaintiffs, who typically are not repeat players in the tort system, 
are uniquely vulnerable to the avarices not only of defense lawyers 
but of unscrupulous plaintiffs’ attorneys.78 This vulnerability 
presents a significant obstacle to the successful implementation of 
tort law.79 Failing to fully enforce Rule 23’s protections will open the 
door for dishonest plaintiffs’ attorneys to seek financial settlements 
that avoid trial while maximizing their own contingency fees, 
thereby not only robbing tort law of its compensatory function but 
diminishing the overall rewards obtained. As even strong claims are 
pushed towards settlement, defendants may escape their wrongs 
relatively unscathed, happily passing the externalities of their 
negligence to plaintiffs and society as a whole. 
Rule 23 protects against the strong financial incentives 
motivating plaintiffs’ lawyers to settle even when settlement is not in 
their clients’ best interest.80 Therefore, although the financial 
incentives of class action settlements do not always encourage an 
optimal resolution for plaintiffs, the strict regulatory requirements 
surrounding settlements provide substantial tools for the judiciary to 
check untoward practices. Settlements may still be an imperfect 
solution for defendants and plaintiffs alike, but because of this 
 
 74. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (permitting a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise 
that binds class members only “after a [court] hearing and on a [court] finding that it is fair, 
reasonable, and adequate”). 
 75. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (setting forth rules for a court’s appointment of class counsel, 
including the requirement that the court “may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel’s 
ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class”). 
 76. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) (limiting the award of attorney’s fees to only those fees that are 
“reasonable”). 
 77. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(d) (2012). 
 78. For examples of strong court oversight of settlements, see In re Cal. Micro Devices Sec. 
Litig., 965 F. Supp 1327 (N.D. Cal. 1997); In re Cal. Micro Devices Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 257 
(N.D. Cal. 1996); see also In re Telesphere Int’l Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ill. 1990); 
Cunningham v. Abbott, Nos. 2007-CA-001971-MR, 2007-CA-001981-MR, 2007-CA-002173-
MR, 2007-CA-2174-MR, 2011 WL 336459 (Ky. App. Feb. 4, 2011). Courts do not, however, 
always provide such vigorous oversight.  
 79. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 8, at 886. 
 80. See Engstrom, supra note 49, at 365 n.8. 
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formalized judicial supervision, they remain a palatable solution 
nevertheless.  
III.  THE RISE AND FALL OF RULE 23 
A.  The Rise of Rule 23 
Although Rule 23’s structural protections are important to the 
successful resolution of many mass torts,81 Rule 23 class certification 
has not always been an option for mass tort litigators. Rather, the 
Advisory Committee to the 1966 revision of Rule 23 made it clear 
that Rule 23 was not intended for mass torts.82 In an advisory note, 
the Committee explained that “[a] ‘mass accident’ resulting in 
injuries to numerous people is ordinarily not appropriate for a class 
action”; the likelihood that significant questions of damages, 
liability, and defenses to liability would affect parties differently was 
too great.83 Mass accidents were reasonably uncommon in 1966 and 
rarely resulted in a large number of separate trials. Thus, for the 1966 
Committee, which saw little need for mass tort class certification, 
this appeared to be an appropriate balance to strike.84 For over a 
decade, courts followed the Committee’s expressed intent, denying 
class certification in the mass tort context. 
Beginning in the 1980s, however, courts increasingly certified 
Rule 23 class actions for mass torts, even where they had previously 
denied certification.85 In 1984, Judge Weinstein certified what was 
then the largest class to date in the Agent Orange litigation, citing, as 
justification, the many challenges inherent to mass torts that would 
inevitably cripple individual Agent Orange lawsuits.86 In the 
 
 81. See supra Part II.C.  
 82. The 1966 revisions created the modern version of Rule 23; see Yeazell, supra note 9, at 
237; see also Engstrom, supra note 49, at 324. 
 83. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966).  
 84. See Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF. 
L. REV. 433 (1960) (cited favorably by the Advisory Committee’s Article to Proposed Rule of 
Civil Procedure) (describing, also, how contingency fees “insure[] effective legal service for any 
injured person who wants a lawyer”). 
 85. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC 
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 24–25 (2000) (describing, as notable, the Agent Orange certification, 
the Fifth Circuit’s first ever upholding of an asbestos class certification, and a surprising Sixth 
Circuit reversal of its previous denial of class certification for personal injury claims). 
 86. Id.; In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 747–48 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(indicating that the difficulty of proof in the mass-tort context, issues surrounding the “Statute of 
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following year, the Fifth Circuit for the first time upheld an asbestos 
class certification.87 The class certification floodgates appeared ready 
to open, and by the late 1980s class certification was no longer 
uncommon in the mass tort context.88 This looming jurisprudential 
shift arrived not a moment too soon; mass accidents of the 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s had created a crushing burden on the judiciary.89 
Although a complete list of products spurring mass actions 
during these decades would stretch for pages, much of the increase in 
litigation resulted from a single substance: asbestos. The judicial 
system was ill-equipped to handle the ongoing asbestos tragedy. 
Millions of potential plaintiffs were exposed to dozens of asbestos 
manufacturers’ products, leading to billions of dollars of present and 
future damages.90 Many of those exposed have still not yet 
developed symptoms,91 and given the ubiquity of asbestos’ 
distribution, few potential plaintiffs can definitively indicate which 
specific manufacturers’ asbestos caused their illness. However, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers were able to overcome much of the uncertainty 
surrounding proof and degree of exposure by combining huge 
numbers of plaintiffs into classes. Plaintiffs’ lawyers highlighted 
those claims most suited for the modern rules of litigation and 
therefore provided recovery for plaintiffs who were undoubtedly 
injured by some of defendants’ products, but who would not have 
had as strong claims if brought individually. This is not to say that 
asbestos claims are not also individually sustainable: they often are. 
 
Limitations and Failure to Determine Who Was Harmed and Who Caused Harm[,]” are but a few 
of the “legal problems posing major obstacles to plaintiffs’ recovery”). 
 87. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1986) (expressing concern 
that courts will be “ill-equipped to handle this ‘avalanche of litigation’” (citation omitted)). 
 88. See HENSLER, supra note 85, at 24–25 (describing many of these certifications, 
including a surprising Sixth Circuit reversal of its previous denial of class certification for 
personal injury claims). 
 89. For a critical perspective on this litigation, see In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 
F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984); Coffee, 
supra note 8 (building on his earlier work and calling into question the value of such class actions 
to plaintiffs); Macey & Miller, supra note 8 (proposing revisions in the regulatory system in the 
context of a discussion of the entrepreneurial attorney).  
 90. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION 
92 (2005), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND 
_MG162.pdf (estimating that the costs of asbestos litigation, including litigation costs and 
settlement and judgment values, totaled over $70 billion through 2002). 
 91. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 1 (1986) (originally published in 1986) (noting that 
asbestosis “symptoms normally take at least 10, and usually 20 or more, years to develop”). 
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But those infirmities that are endemic to asbestos claims, such as the 
challenge of proving causation and responsibility, are largely 
palliated by the class action structure. 
Even given the powerful incentives to group asbestos suits, the 
widespread harm caused by asbestos led to a flood of individually 
filed claims. From the time that the public became aware of the harm 
caused by asbestos in the 1970s,92 the quantity of asbestos-related 
litigation grew exponentially. In the mid-1980s, asbestos litigation 
alone accounted for a significant percentage of civil filings in a 
number of jurisdictions.93 For example, by 1990, one-third of all civil 
cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas were asbestos personal 
injury claims.94 Courts and defendants alike were overwhelmed by 
these claims, welcoming class certification as a means of efficiently 
resolving these conflicts and effectively assuring finality. Plaintiffs’ 
lawyers increasingly filed class certification motions to resolve not 
just asbestos but other mass torts.95 
As the 1966 Advisory Committee’s remonstration against class 
certification for mass accidents grew more distant, the burden that 
mass torts placed on the court system multiplied. Plaintiffs’ and 
defense lawyers alike supported class certification, and courts were 
becoming all too willing to oblige. Facing an onslaught of claims in 
the waning years of the twentieth century, district courts took 
advantage of new, less literal readings of Rule 23, devising “creative 
class structures to forge mass settlements.”96 Again and again, mass 
tort class actions were certified—largely for the purpose of seeking 
settlement—as district courts responded to crises caused by asbestos, 
Agent Orange, Bendectin, Fen-Phen, and the dozens of other large-
 
 92. Asbestos’ toxicity was discovered in 1906, and evidence linking asbestos to various lung 
diseases grew through the first decades of the twentieth century. James L. Stengel, The Asbestos 
End-Game, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 223, 227 (2006); Asbestos, AM. CANCER SOC’Y 
(2010), http://www.cancer.org/Cancer/CancerCauses/OtherCarcinogens/Pollution/asbestos 
?sitearea=PE; 60 AM. JUR. Trials § 73 (1996). Yet, it was not until the 1960s that the United 
States public awoke to asbestos’ dangers, and the substance’s use was curtailed in new 
construction. Id. At this point, it was too late; asbestos was present in schoolhouses, office 
buildings, and countless products used daily by millions of Americans nationwide. Id. 
 93. See Hensler, As Time Goes By, supra note 14, at 1900. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 885–86 (describing how lawyers may have flocked too 
quickly to mass torts such as the Agent Orange, Bhopal, and Dalkon Shield litigations, collecting 
clients at an impossibly fast rate). 
 96. Engstrom, supra note 49, at 327. 
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scale injuries caused by mass production and an increasingly 
globalized supply chain, wherein a single defect in a product can lead 
to millions of illnesses or injuries.97 
B.  The Fall of Mass Tort Class Action Settlements 
But as soon as the era of mass tort class actions appeared ready 
to begin, it came crashing to an end. In Amchem Products, Inc. v. 
Windsor98 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,99 the Supreme Court re-
affirmed the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 23, holding that 
irrespective of society’s need for relaxed class certification 
standards, Rule 23 must be read as the Committee intended: 
narrowly.100 
1.  Amchem Restricts Rule 23(a) 
In Amchem, a global, settlement-only class had been certified by 
Judge Weiner of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a suit against 
twenty former asbestos manufacturers (known as the “CCR”).101 All 
prospective class members sought recovery for injuries due to 
asbestos exposure. Prospective class members complained of a range 
of differing levels of exposure to asbestos, an inherent characteristic 
of asbestos and other mass tort claims. Although a number of district 
judges had certified broad classes,102 as was common in the mass tort 
context, the Third Circuit denied certification, noting that the 
proposed class members had been “exposed to different asbestos-
containing products, in different ways, over different periods, and for 
 
 97. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF 
MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1998) (Bendectin); MUNDY, supra note 4 (Fen-Phen); 
PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 
(enlarged ed. 1987) (Agent Orange); see also MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH 
OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996) (breast implants); 
PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985) 
(asbestos). 
 98. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 99. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 100. Amchem and Ortiz were but the first of a number of Supreme Court opinions to limit 
Rule 23. Because Amchem and Ortiz involved the same sort of mass torts discussed in this 
Article, this Part focuses on these two cases. 
 101. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 591. 
 102. See Jody L. Gallegos, Three Decades of Frustration: Finally, A Solution to the Asbestos 
Problem, 15 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 61, 72–73 (2000) (describing the history of asbestos 
class certification leading up to Amchem and Ortiz). 
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different amounts of time.”103 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
and agreed: “Rule 23, which must be interpreted with fidelity . . . and 
applied with the interests of absent class members in close view, 
cannot carry the large load CCR, class counsel, and the District 
Court heaped upon it.”104 It mattered little that plaintiffs and 
defendants only had requested class certification for the purpose of 
reaching a settlement. Notwithstanding the importance and 
complexity of asbestos litigation,105 Rule 23 “demand[s] undiluted, 
even heightened, attention in the settlement context.”106 Thus, rather 
than allowing a relaxed application of Rule 23 for mass tort class 
action settlements, the Supreme Court reasserted the Advisory 
Commission’s admonition that the Rule was not appropriate for mass 
torts. 
This holding threw the mass tort world into disarray. Plaintiffs 
in modern mass torts usually have been exposed to defendants’ 
products in different ways and for varying lengths of time.107 
Moreover, asbestos litigation was far from the most problematic 
category of mass tort; asbestos’ causation of asbestosis, as well as of 
many cancers,108 was well-established, and therefore what is 
normally a substantial challenge in the mass-tort context was not 
significantly at issue.109 The Supreme Court sent a clear message 
with Amchem: no flexibility could be read into the Rule 23(a) class 
requirements, even if a strict reading of these requirements meant 
that few mass tort classes could be certified. 
2.  Ortiz Restricts Rule 23(b) 
Two years later, the Supreme Court once again refused to bend 
the rigid class certification requirements and invalidated a Rule 
 
 103. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 609. 
 104. Id. at 629. 
 105. These dual points were emphasized by Justice Breyer in a separate opinion. Id. at 630–
31. 
 106. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620. 
 107. See Noah Smith-Drelich, The Specific Causation Paradox (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the author). 
 108. Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov 
/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/asbestos (last updated May 1, 2009) (noting that asbestos has been 
classified as a “known human carcinogen” by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services). 
 109. See Smith-Drelich, supra note 107. 
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23(b)(1)(B) asbestos certification.110 As in Amchem, at issue in Ortiz 
was the level of discretion afforded to district courts when 
interpreting Rule 23’s requirements, specifically in the context of 
mass tort litigation. The district court in Ortiz recognized that the 
defendant, Fibreboard, was being slowly forced into bankruptcy by 
the litigation, and relaxed 23(b)(1)(B)’s historical limited fund 
criteria so as to give “the class as a whole . . . the best deal” by 
allowing Fibreboard “to remain a working enterprise.”111 As in 
Amchem, however, differences within the class—of the sort inherent 
to mass tort class actions—raised the possibility that there were 
conflicts of interest within the class. Once again, the Supreme Court 
insisted that the Rule 23 requirements must be strictly applied, even 
if it precluded certification of mass tort classes. 
Thus, first in Amchem and then in Ortiz, the Supreme Court 
“rejected a massive asbestos class action settlement for failing to 
comport with the requirements of Rule 23 despite claims that the 
settlement was not only necessary but also substantively and 
procedurally fair, if not the best that could be achieved.”112 Little 
question was left as to the future of mass tort class action 
settlements. The “elephantine mass” of mass torts could not be 
unraveled within the class action regulatory framework, not even “to 
avoid delay and expense so great as to bring about a massive denial 
of justice.”113 Although mass tort class actions can be certified after 
Amchem and Ortiz, they rarely are.  
IV.  MASS TORTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF  
AMCHEM AND ORTIZ 
Deprived of the option of class certification, mass tort defense 
and plaintiffs’ attorneys alike are faced with a choice: either they can 
litigate tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of cases individually in the 
court system, or they may look outside the current regulatory 
 
 110. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999). 
 111. Id. at 882–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 112. George M Cohen, The “Fair” Is the Enemy of the Good: Ortiz v. Fibreboard 
Corporation and Class Action Settlements, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 23, 25 (2000). Amchem and 
Ortiz have been followed by Wal-Mart v. Dukes. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 
(2011). While Dukes was not a mass-torts case, in Dukes the Supreme Court once again insisted 
on a restricted reading of Rule 23’s requirements, even when such a narrow construction had the 
effect of making certification in cases similar to Dukes difficult. Id. 
 113. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 866–67 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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framework for justice. In this context, the emergence of private, 
contract-driven settlements like the Vioxx Agreement was 
inevitable.114 
A.  Settlements and the Vioxx Agreement 
Amchem and Ortiz made the certification of large classes 
difficult for the resolution of mass torts. In fact, according to a study 
released in the aftermath of Amchem and Ortiz, only 22 percent of 
class actions removed to federal court were ultimately certified.115 As 
predicted, courts have been especially skeptical when faced with 
consumer product classes.116 Interestingly, although state courts have 
been perceived as more receptive to certifying nationwide class 
actions,117 state courts do not certify classes at a significantly higher 
rate than federal courts.118 This is because many state courts follow 
Amchem, and because of the effects of CAFA, which “expanded 
Amchem’s limitation of judicial regulation” by diminishing the 
impact of certification-friendly state jurisdictions.119 
 
 114. The exception to this rule is MDL No. 875, a multidistrict litigation created in 1991 by 
the JPML to manage the asbestos personal injury and wrongful death cases. About MDL 875, 
U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR E. DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, http://www.paed.uscourts.gov 
/mdl875a.asp (last visited Mar. 16, 2013). The MDL has had over 121,000 cases transferred to it, 
and has settled, dismissed, or remanded over 108,000 of those cases. Id.; see also Multi-District 
Litigation Funding, RD LEGAL FUNDING, http://www.legalfunding.com/eligible-cases/multi 
-district-litigation-funding/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014) (providing statistics). However, the rate at 
which asbestos claims have been resolved—an average of over 4,000 each day, Aricka Flowers, 
MDL Judge Could Change the Game of Asbestos Litigation, SOUTHEAST TEX. REC. 
(Apr. 17, 2009), http://setexasrecord.com/news/220607-mdl-judge-could-change-the-game-of 
-asbestos-litigation—should raise questions about whether the MDL is sacrificing justice in the 
name of efficiency. 
 115. Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class 
Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 605 (2006). 
But see BOB NIEMIC & TOM WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EFFECTS OF AMCHEM/ORTIZ ON 
THE FILING OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS: REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RULES (2002), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/AmChem.pdf/$file/ 
AmChem.pdf (finding an increase in the filing of class actions following Ortiz). 
 116. See Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting 
that the Ninth Circuit “has recognized the potential difficulties of ‘commonality’ and 
‘management’ inherent in certifying products liability class actions”); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 
75 F.3d 1069, 1081 (6th Cir. 1996) (commenting that, after Amchem and Ortiz, products liability 
classes present challenges for certification because they usually involve factual and legal issues 
that vary from individual to individual). 
 117. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 14 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14–15. 
 118. See Willging & Wheatman, supra note 115, at 599. 
 119. See Alec Johnson, Vioxx and Consumer Product Pain Relief: The Policy Implications of 
Limiting Courts’ Regulatory Influence over Mass Consumer Product Claims, 41 LOY. L.A. L. 
MASS TORT 4/21/2015 9:51 PM 
32 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1 
 
Thus, after Amchem and Ortiz, few litigants were able to take 
advantage of Rule 23 in crafting their settlements. Enter Vioxx. A 
pain medication shown to substantially increase heart attack and 
stroke risk, Vioxx may have caused up to 160,000 cases of heart 
attacks and strokes before it was pulled from the market.120 However, 
because the detrimental health effects of Vioxx were exclusively 
short-term, the number of potential plaintiffs was finite.121 Although 
a motion for class certification was filed shortly after Vioxx’s 
withdrawal, it was denied.122 In denying class certification, Judge 
Fallon cited “‘a vast number of different persons, who took different 
dosages of Vioxx, at different times’ and who suffered widely 
different injuries from their exposure.”123 
In the absence of class certification, the resulting flood of 
individual suits filed was massive, “spanning six years and involving 
the production of over 50 million pages of documents and the taking 
of more than 2,000 depositions.”124 Defending these suits cost 
Merck, Vioxx’s manufacturer, $1 million a day, according to press 
reports.125 
Moreover, despite winning eleven out of the eighteen 
“bellwether” trials filed, Merck, facing high punitive damages, was 
eager to settle. Plaintiffs, too, sought resolution of their cases through 
settlement. Ironically, even while the evidence strongly supported 
plaintiffs’ general claim that Vioxx caused heart attacks and strokes, 
plaintiffs found it difficult to prove specific causation, “that this 
Vioxx caused this stroke.”126 And the Supreme Court had recently 
granted certiorari in Wyeth v. Levine,127 which involved the 
preemption of drug company liability by FDA approval, leaving 
many plaintiffs’ lawyers concerned that the Court was “on the verge 
of adopting a strong preemption position that would leave plaintiffs 
 
REV. 1039, 1074–76 (2008) (describing the impact of Amchem and Ortiz on nationwide class 
actions). For a complete discussion of how CAFA affects this reform, see id. 
 120. Engstrom, supra note 49, at 370 (describing a later, independent study completed by Dr. 
Eric Topol and published in the New England Journal of Medicine). 
 121. Id. at 369–70. 
 122. Id. at 370. Given Amchem and Ortiz, this denial was thoroughly unsurprising. 
 123. Id. at 370–71 (quoting Judge Fallon’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion for class certification). 
 124. Id. at 371. 
 125. Id. Ultimately, the costs of defending Vioxx totaled over $1 billion. Id. 
 126. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 127. 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
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empty-handed.”128 Thus, the Vioxx litigation was an ideal vehicle for 
an innovative settlement mechanism: everybody wanted to settle. 
Merck’s announcement of a $4.85 billion settlement agreement in 
November 2007 was a welcome relief to plaintiffs’ and defense 
attorneys alike, as well as the overburdened courts. This settlement 
bought Merck finality at a relative discount,129 while providing 
individual plaintiffs certain remediation for their injuries—which 
was more than what individual litigation could offer. 
This settlement was not a Rule 23 class action settlement, but 
rather a private contractual agreement made between Merck and the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys who represented multiple Vioxx-injured 
plaintiffs. Strikingly, the Agreement required these plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to recommend settlement to each of their Vioxx clients if 
any one of their clients signed onto the settlement. Moreover, for any 
client who decided not to participate in the settlement, the signatory 
law firms promised “‘to the extent permitted’ by applicable strictures 
of legal ethics, ‘to disengage . . . from the representation’ of any such 
dissenting client.”130 Put simply, a lawyer could “recommend the 
settlement to all of her eligible clients or to none of them.”131 Before 
determining whether to recommend enrollment in the program, an 
enrolling attorney also agreed to exercise his or her independent 
judgment in the best interest of each client individually.132 Settlement 
amounts were determined by a point system, through which plaintiffs 
deemed eligible for compensation—not all were—were assigned 
points based on a combination of factors seeking to approximate the 
strength and value of the plaintiff’s case. For example, the severity of 
the plaintiff’s injury, the length of time the plaintiff took Vioxx, the 
proximity between the injury and the plaintiff’s Vioxx use, and the 
plaintiff’s personal risk factors were taken into account.133 Awards 
 
 128. Engstrom, supra note 49, at 371. The Supreme Court did not adopt such a position, 
instead holding 6-3 that the FDA’s approval of the medication did not shield Wyeth 
Pharmaceuticals from state law liability. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). The holding was 
announced nearly two years after the Vioxx agreement. 
 129. Financial analysts predicted that the cases were worth up to $25 billion. A Lot at Stake 
for Merck in Vioxx Suits, CNN MONEY (Jul. 12, 2005, 10:27 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2005 
/07/11/news/fortune500/vioxx/index.htm. 
 130. Engstrom, supra note 49, at 372 (quoting settlement agreement). 
 131. Id. at 372–73. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See, e.g., id. at 373–74. 
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were determined by taking the total points of all claimants and 
dividing it by the settlement plot. Finally, Merck retained the right to 
withdraw from the settlement if fewer than 85 percent of the 
plaintiffs agreed to it. The entire Agreement provided for oversight 
by Judge Fallon, who agreed to lend his experience and the weight of 
his office toward ensuring a successful settlement; although, in doing 
so he was serving as the “Chief Administrator” of the settlement, 
rather than as a Rule 23 judge.134 Notably, Judge Fallon was granted 
significant authority to ensure that the terms of the Agreement were 
not “prohibited or unenforceable to any extent.”135 Judge Fallon did 
not, however, have the use of the full panoply of his judicial powers, 
such as contempt, to do so. 
The Agreement was not bound by class action restrictions, but 
its terms in large part replicate those found in class action 
settlements.136 Why, if they were free to avoid the risk and burden of 
judicial oversight, did the Agreement’s drafters nevertheless give 
Judge Fallon “broad power?”137 Although including such assurances 
of fairness likely sweetened the settlement deal for plaintiffs, Judge 
Fallon’s involvement also served a crucial legal function: a sitting 
judge’s acceptance of the contract’s terms gave the Agreement 
legitimacy and mitigated what ethical concerns otherwise might have 
kneecapped the Agreement. 
And there were no small number of potential ethical violations 
associated with the Agreement. Leading ethicists have raised 
numerous objections to the terms of the Agreement.138 In particular, 
Rule 1.16(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits 
 
 134. Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed on the 
Signature Pages Hereto §§ 9.2.4, 9.2.5, 16.4.2 (Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://cdn.levinlaw 
.com/pdf/Vioxx-Master-Settlement-Agreement.pdf. 
 135. Id. § 16.4.2; see also id. §§ 9.2.4, 9.2.5. 
 136. See, for example, the terms of the Dow Corning breast-cancer settlement described in 
ANGELL, supra note 97, at 194. 
 137. Engstrom, supra note 49, at 373. 
 138. See Mark Donald, Plaintiffs Counsel Disagree Over Ethical Duties in Vioxx Settlement, 
23 TEXAS LAWYER 1 (2007); Erichson, supra note 14, at 1002; Johnson, supra note 119, at 1088; 
see also Alex Berenson, Lawyers Seek to Alter Settlement Over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 
2007, at C4; Adam Liptak, In Vioxx Settlement, Testing a Legal Ideal: A Lawyer’s Loyalty, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/22/us/22bar.html; Antitrust Objection to 
Vioxx Settlement, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Jan. 23, 2008), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com 
/2008/01/antitrust-objection-to-vioxx-settlement.html (describing the ethical problems raised by 
Professor George Cohen of Virginia, “a particularly vocal critic of the settlement”).  
MASS TORT 4/21/2015 9:51 PM 
Fall 2014] MASS TORT SETTLEMENTS 35 
 
attorneys from withdrawing from representation for an improper 
reason.139 The Agreement, however, required signatory lawyers to 
withdraw from representing any client who did not wish to settle 
with Merck—which is not a proper reason for withdrawal.140 Model 
Rule 1.2(a) requires that attorneys abide by their clients’ decisions,141 
yet the Agreement was made between Merck and the lawyers, and 
restricted the lawyers’ ability to respond to client concerns. 
Specifically, the Agreement sought to eliminate the opt-out problem 
typical to class action settlements; in class action settlements, it is not 
uncommon for lawyers to encourage those clients with the strongest 
suits to opt out of the settlement, leaving only those class members 
with weak claims bound by the terms of the settlement. The 
Agreement successfully prevented participating lawyers from opting 
out clients with especially strong claims and less than 1 percent of 
plaintiffs ultimately opted out.142 Moreover, Rule 2.1 of the Model 
Rules requires attorneys to exercise independent judgment,143 but the 
Agreement effectively forces attorneys to treat all of their clients as 
one. Finally, Rule 5.6 prohibits agreements that improperly restrict 
the lawyer’s right to practice.144 The Agreement seeks to do just that 
through its coercive, all-or-nothing provisions. Although many of the 
attorney signatories likely did not have their decisions constrained by 
the Agreement’s terms, the Agreement would not have succeeded 
had it not effectively restricted some of the attorneys who were party 
to its terms. 
Thus, although the Vioxx Agreement appeared to replicate Rule 
23, conspicuously absent from its terms was anything approximating 
23(a)(4), 23(e)(2), or 23(g): the fail-safes for attorney misconduct. 
Substantially compounding this problem was the Agreement’s strong 
 
 139. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b) (Discussion Draft 1980). 
 140. That this requirement included the caveat that no lawyer should violate legal ethics in 
withdrawing from representation is somewhat of an empty assurance; it is a stretch to accept that 
the Agreement’s terms can be a proper reason for withdrawing, and, thus, any lawyer who 
followed the Agreement’s urging and withdrew may have committed a per se violation of this 
ethical rule. See Antitrust Objection to Vioxx Settlement, supra note 138. 
 141. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (2011). 
 142. See Merck Argues Vioxx Case Before U.S. Supreme Court, MERCK.COM (Nov. 30, 
2009), http://www.merck.com/newsroom/news-release-archive/corporate/2009_1130.html (citing 
that 99 percent of eligible parties enrolled in the settlement). 
 143. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (2011). 
 144. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6 (2011). 
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discouragement of plaintiffs opting out; although the Vioxx 
Agreement addressed a class best encapsulated by 23(b)(3), it took 
its lead from the 23(b)(2) mandatory classes. The Vioxx Agreement 
drafters could thus craft a class favorable to defendants without 
worrying that its strongest members would opt out and sue 
separately. Plaintiffs were trapped in an unfavorable class, 
represented by attorneys who appeared, at times, more accountable 
to Merck than to their own clients.145 
Although the structural problems inherent in the Vioxx 
Agreement were not immediately apparent—this is the first Article 
to cast light on the Agreement’s ingenious mimicry of Rule 23—the 
numerous ethical questions were. And yet, only one state’s ethics 
board issued an opinion on the subject146—an informal opinion that 
appears unlikely to have had any impact on the overall number of 
signatories to the Agreement: over 99 percent of plaintiffs ultimately 
took part in the settlement.147 Judge Fallon’s involvement in the 
Agreement appears to have given it a sufficient degree of legitimacy 
to clear its ethical hurdles. The vast majority of settlement payments 
have been disbursed, and yet no lawyers have faced any sort of 
reprimand or sanction, let alone disbarment, for their participation. 
This is the future of mass tort settlements.148 After Amchem and 
Ortiz, few mass tort prospective classes will meet the rigid Rule 23 
requirements for certification. Yet plaintiffs, defendants, and the 
court system alike all need an efficient model for settlement of these 
claims. The Vioxx Agreement presents exactly such a model, solving 
the apparent conflict of maintaining a healthy settlement class 
without suffering a loss of propriety. Although it was not the first 
non-class aggregate settlement, the Agreement’s particular 
contingencies ensured a remarkable degree of all-or-nothing 
compliance. By contracting with plaintiffs’ attorneys, the defense 
ensured that all cases, and not merely the weakest ones, were 
 
 145. See, e.g., Donald, supra note 138. 
 146. Conn. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 08-01 (2008), available at 
http://forctlawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/08-01-final-signed.pdf. 
 147. Merck Argues Vioxx Case Before U.S. Supreme Court, supra note 142. 
 148. This may also be the future of workplace discrimination settlements; the Vioxx model 
need not be limited to the mass-tort context. There is nothing stopping an employer like  
Wal-Mart, eager to escape the bad publicity that accompanies workplace discrimination suits, 
from similarly contracting with plaintiffs’ attorneys to quiet even those claims that appear no 
longer viable as class actions. 
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included in the settlement. And although this crucial provision raised 
serious ethical concerns, by voluntarily building in many of the 
protections required by class action law—pseudo-judicial oversight 
in particular—the agreement passed, if not bypassed, ethical 
scrutiny. 
B.  The (Non-)Deterrence of Vioxx Agreements 
The success of the Vioxx Agreement indicates that the question 
of “how to legitimize the mechanism of coercion in the advancement 
of peace” can be answered: by “driving peacemaking toward . . . 
private contract”149—so long, at least, as that contract locks all 
plaintiffs and their lawyers into the agreement. Other “Vioxx 
Agreements”150 may make use of a variety of alternative, creative 
provisions, but it is not difficult to begin to imagine how they might 
be structured.151 One particularly damaging condition of the Vioxx 
Agreement—its insistence that plaintiffs’ lawyers recommend the 
deal to their clients and to withdraw if any client declines—is sure to 
be replicated in future non-class action mass settlement agreements, 
at least where plaintiffs have no hope of becoming a certified class. 
Without fear of a viable class action lawsuit, savvy defense attorneys 
will implement lock-in provisions with greater and greater 
frequency, knowing that with the right incentive, many plaintiffs’ 
attorneys will gladly abandon the less-attractive proposition of filing 
hundreds or thousands of individual lawsuits. Ironically, as such 
contractual agreements relieve the stress of mass torts on the judicial 
system, calls for reform of Rule 23 will gradually diminish. 
The implications of placing mass tort justice into the calloused 
hands of the market are serious. When Rule 23 classes—even 
settlement-only classes—provide at least a potential basis for 
settlement, plaintiffs have some assurance that Rule 23’s protections 
and oversight will limit any abuses by either defendants or plaintiffs’ 
lawyers. Should defendants deviate far from Rule 23 in creating non-
 
 149. Engstrom, supra note 49, at 388. 
 150. In future references, this Article will use the phrase “Vioxx Agreements” to refer to any 
such non-class mass settlement that effectively locks plaintiffs’ lawyers and plaintiffs into the 
settlement group. 
 151. The Vioxx settlement, with a fixed group of plaintiffs, was in many ways an especially 
easy case to settle. Future mass-tort settlements may require additional provisions, partially 
replicating Rule 23(b)(1)(B) or other portions of the class action rule. 
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class aggregate settlements that undermine the adversarial process, 
plaintiffs and their more-responsible lawyers will have the safety of 
Rule 23 to fall back on. Without even so much of a threat of a class 
action lawsuit, however, defendants have less incentive to stay 
within Rule 23’s bounds in crafting settlements maximally favorable 
to their interests—and plaintiffs’ lawyers will be less able or less 
willing to effectively combat such settlements. The consequences of 
such unbound settlements may be serious. 
First, problems inherent in the lack of Rule 23(a)’s numerosity-, 
commonality-, typicality-, or adequacy-of-representation-checks are 
likely to arise. Defendants will prefer to achieve the broadest 
arrangements possible and can strategically propose settlements built 
around their own weak “class” of plaintiffs. Those plaintiffs thrust to 
the forefront of negotiations may not necessarily have claims typical 
of the “class” they represent, and lawyers acting on behalf of the 
“class” will no longer be restrained by Rule 23’s oversight to 
represent the whole “class” adequately. Without judicial enforcement 
of Rule 23(a)’s checks, defendants will be free to buy finality from 
disreputable plaintiffs’ lawyers with as broad and as weak of a group 
of plaintiffs as possible.152 And, in so buying-off the plaintiffs bar, 
defendants may effectively foreclose the possibility of later strong 
suits emerging—all at a relative pittance. Given the information 
asymmetries inherent to mass tort actions, this could have serious 
access-to-justice implications. Moreover, from a societal perspective, 
defense attorneys’ ability to strategically avoid or diminish Rule 
23(a)’s protections will lead to smaller settlement awards and 
systemic under-deterrence of future harm. 
Second, as defendants become more creative in crafting these 
arrangements, agreements will emerge with terms that do not mirror 
Rule 23(b). Defendants may choose to structure agreements that 
provide inadequate notice or effectively do not permit plaintiffs to 
opt out (just as the Vioxx Agreement did not). This, too, will lead to 
smaller total recoveries for plaintiffs and systemic under-deterrence, 
as plaintiffs with strong individual suits who would have opted out if 
they had been given notice or an opportunity will be grouped in the 
 
 152. See Slater, supra note 54. Although it is possible that plaintiffs’ lawyers can be similarly 
“bought off” in the Rule 23 context, the incentive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to agree to such 
ethically marginal arrangements is substantially diminished when a viable alternative exists. 
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settlement agreement and prevented from seeking any additional 
remedy. 
Third, absent the protection of Rules 23(a), (e)(2), or (g), 
plaintiffs will lack the assurance that their individual interests will be 
represented. Not even the Vioxx Agreement provided plaintiffs with 
protection from their own attorneys, other than an admonition that 
attorneys should follow their ethical obligations. Thus, the Vioxx 
plaintiffs’ attorneys were free to negotiate settlement awards that 
benefited their own interests over those of their clients. The very 
structure of the Agreement itself ensured that not all plaintiffs would 
be adequately represented, yet a sitting judge acting in a semi-private 
capacity did nothing to intervene.153 The powerful financial 
incentives driving plaintiffs’ attorneys to settle quickly will likely 
lead to substantial under-deterrence in the absence of formal judicial 
oversight.154 
Fourth, a proliferation of Vioxx Agreements will put immense 
pressure on the judges who administer these Agreements. Such 
additional, non-statutorily-imposed duties could change the nature of 
the judiciary. Given the unique situations and novel contractual 
provisions that will begin to emerge, judicial resources may be taxed 
merely by virtue of judges’ learning curve for each new complicated 
agreement. Furthermore, even as these agreements proffer oversight 
to judges with one hand, they will take away judicial control with the 
other. Pre-settlement negotiations often influence, if not determine, 
the eventual settlement reached, and they are overseen by judges in 
cases brought before the court—but no such oversight is necessarily 
provided for by extra-judicial contractual arrangements. Similarly, 
most judges actively manage cases in their dockets, intervening if it 
appears that one party’s counsel is not adequately acting on behalf of 
that party’s interests, or if some other injustice has occurred. There 
are also additional mechanisms of judicial control provided by rule, 
 
 153. In fact, Judge Fallon went on the record to describe the settlement as fair and adequate. 
Although Judge Fallon’s oversight may have been similarly ineffective in the Rule 23 context, 
plaintiffs would have then at least had the recourse of appealing his Rule 23 judgment on the 
basis that he had failed to adequately enforce Rule 23—an option not available to aggrieved 
Vioxx Agreement signatories (who could not appeal Judge Fallon’s failure to follow Rule 23 as 
the settlement was not bound by Rule 23). 
 154. See supra Part II. 
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including oversight of lawyer fees155 and coupon settlements,156 and 
the latitude to reject unfair settlements.157 None of these are 
guaranteed by Vioxx Agreements. Thus, more broadly inclusive 
settlements—and therefore under-deterrence—should be expected to 
arise along with these non-Rule 23 settlements. 
Finally, economic theory predicts that individual plaintiffs, less 
able to bear the risk of trial and thus more eager to settle, will be 
disadvantaged in settlement negotiations.158 In the context of class 
action litigation, much of this disadvantage is mitigated by the threat 
of a class action trial, which gives plaintiffs collectively a bargaining 
chip they otherwise would not individually possess. Here, where 
Ortiz and Amchem limit class certification, plaintiffs no longer can 
make this powerful threat: a plaintiff must either accept a defendant’s 
offer or sue as an individual. Thus, the lack of a credible class action 
threat gives defendants an advantage additional to the procedural 
advantages that defendants gain by circumventing Rule 23. This will 
result in smaller settlement totals for plaintiffs, and also the chipping 
away of individual liberties normally protected by regulation, as such 
agreements increasingly push the ethical envelope. 
Although judges will continue to be involved in these private 
contractual settlements so as to alleviate ethical concerns, without the 
formal protection of Rule 23 and CAFA, defendants are likely to 
structure these agreements so as to allow themselves greater leeway 
than would be permitted by the current regulatory framework. Judges 
play a critical role in checking the destructive cross-incentives 
affecting plaintiffs’ attorneys that would otherwise undermine justice 
and fairness in class action settlements. Including judicial oversight 
only to the extent desired by defendants and plaintiffs’ lawyers will 
ensure that plaintiffs—the parties most in need of judicial 
protection—receive the short end of the stick in settlement 
negotiations. This will result in not only a substantial loss of plaintiff 
 
 155. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h). 
 156. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2006). 
 157. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Also, the absence of objectors in Vioxx agreements, id., removes yet 
another check on the fairness of Rule 23 settlements. 
 158. Cf., e.g., Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Judicial Conference of the D.C. Circuit, 105 
F.R.D. 251, 290 (1984). (“The plain fact is that, with very rare exceptions, in our culture, parties 
who are disadvantaged in litigation are even more disadvantaged in alternative-dispute-resolution 
settings when the courts are closed to them.”). 
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autonomy but in the systemic under-deterrence of future defendant 
misbehavior. 
Most of these factors are present, to some extent, in any non-
class aggregate settlement. Without the threat of a viable Rule 23 
class, however, defendants have far more leeway to achieve 
settlements that favor their interests. The Vioxx Agreement, and its 
all-or-nothing lock-in provisions, is evidence of how defendants can 
take advantage of non-class settlement structures in circumstances 
where no Rule 23 class is viable. 
V.  WE NEED NOT “SETTLE” FOR VIOXX AGREEMENTS 
Fortunately, there are several possible resolutions to this 
looming problem. One is to turn to the parties responsible for 
approving these arrangements for help: judges. By refusing to 
participate as administrator of Vioxx Agreements, judges would 
avoid lending legitimacy to these problematic arrangements.159 Even 
judges who are not personally involved in administrating settlement 
agreements could help by refusing to enforce settlement contracts 
with problematic clauses. Such actions would help stem the damage 
from Vioxx Agreements. But they do not present a panacea: without 
broader systemic changes, untoward settlement practices would 
likely continue outside of the occasional settlement-unfriendly 
district. 
Another option is to look to the rulemakers for change. A 
legislative solution could help provide that needed systemic change 
and prevent the injustice and under-deterrence that will accompany a 
proliferation of Vioxx Agreements. Doing so, however, risks 
disturbing the Rules’ careful calibration of the interests of plaintiffs, 
defendants, and society, not to mention the balancing of efficiency 
and justiciability inherent in Rule 23. More crucially, legislative 
reform requires a legislature willing and able to act. Given the 
current political climate of inaction, a legislative solution 
unfortunately thus remains a long shot. 
 
 159. And it bears repeating: judges should not participate in such arrangements. Any judge 
who participates in her official capacity may be participating in coercing settlement, in violation 
of Canon 3(A)(5) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges and its accompanying 
commentary. A judge who acts in her unofficial capacity may be moonlighting as a private 
arbitrator in violation of Canon 4(A)(4) or as an administrator in violation of Canon 4(E). Code of 
Conduct for U.S. Judges Canon 3(A)(4)–(5), 4(E) (2003). 
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There is another broad-sweeping solution on hand, one that does 
not rely on the slow-moving and overly-politicized involvement of 
legislators: jurisdictions can attain closer-to-optimal mass tort 
deterrence, even in the absence of permissive class certification, by 
aggressively sanctioning the plaintiffs’ attorneys who do not act in 
the best interests of their clients in settling outside of Rule 23’s 
protections.160 And unlike a change brought about by individual 
judges’ refusal to participate in Vioxx Agreements, a sanction-based 
solution may be accomplished in just one or two fell swoops: it is the 
threat of reprimand, sanction, or disbarment that will serve as a 
substantial counterweight to the financial incentives driving 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to fail to act in the best interest of their clients. 
Thus, sanctions need only be threatened in a small handful of high-
profile instances to effect a change in the settlement of non-class 
mass actions. Ethics regulators and public interest groups need only 
see judicial involvement in non-class mass settlement for what it is—
defendants’ clever attempt to cloak problematic arrangements in the 
shroud of the judge’s legitimacy—and actively pursue those ethics 
violations that will necessarily accompany the new generation of 
Vioxx Agreements.  
The remainder of this Article will discuss this proposal.161 Part 
V begins by outlining how regulation of Vioxx Agreements would 
work, starting by exploring what sanctions will be effective (V.A), 
turning then to discuss when and where sanctions should be 
implemented (V.B), and finally identifying who should regulate 
Vioxx Agreements (V.C). Part V then concludes with a discussion of 
why this proposal should be implemented (V.D). 
A.  Deterring Unethical Vioxx Agreements 
What must be done to deter Vioxx Agreements? This initial 
question may also be the easiest. Because the function of sanctions in 
the context of this proposal is to motivate plaintiffs’ lawyers to 
zealously represent their clients, any action that discourages ethics 
 
 160. Defense attorneys and state court judges should also be sanctioned for participation in 
problematic Vioxx Agreements (for, respectively, proposing and approving such problematic 
arrangements). Article III limits the consequences that may be directed at federal judges. 
 161. To my knowledge, no other scholarship has considered using ethical sanctions to 
influence the deterrence value of tort law, let alone in this context.  
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violations (at least of the sort that relate to zealous representation) 
will be effective. This could include fines, limitations on practice, 
and disbarment, as well as reprimands from either the bench or from 
ethics committees. So long as the consequences are sufficiently 
unpleasant to adequately deter, it does not matter exactly what that 
punishment is.162 It is even possible that news coverage of 
settlements or outreach by public interest groups could have an 
impact on the ethical quality of the plaintiffs’ bar in this context, 
whether such public efforts would shame lawyers into better 
practices or whether lawyers would cease unethical behaviors for 
fear of losing future clients and referrals.163 
The effects of such public shaming, however, would be limited 
by many plaintiffs’ ignorance as to their lawyer’s qualifications. 
Fortunately, state bars can help here too, with requirements that 
every attorney advertisement publicize a local ethics hotline and 
include notice of any sanctions against that attorney. When 
consumers know not only that Larry “The Hammer” Rangler will 
“fight for YOU,” but have a number to call when Larry seems to be 
cheating them (and the knowledge that he has been sanctioned on 
three previous occasions), plaintiffs’ influence in discouraging 
problematic lawyering, and therefore in balancing the tort law 
deterrence equation, will grow. 
Moreover, because the primary goal of these sanctions is 
deterrence, rather than retribution or corrective justice, it is possible 
that as few as a handful of high-profile, highly punitive sanctioning 
actions will be sufficient to bring plaintiffs’ lawyering back into 
compliance with the Model Rules in the context of Vioxx 
Agreements. Should plaintiffs’ lawyers become widely aware that 
the consequence for their failure to zealously represent the best 
interests of all of their clients could be disbarment or sanction, 
deterrence may follow even if draconian penalties are only used a 
handful of times. Thus, the actions of only a small handful of ethics 
 
 162. This flexibility also means that a state bar short on funding can use fines to support its 
ethics enforcement. 
 163. The small group of elite plaintiffs firms that repeatedly handle large class actions would 
be most impacted by such measures: reputation, for these firms, is a valuable business commodity 
insofar as it ensures that they will continue to be appointed lead counsel in large mass actions. 
Because of the importance of reputation to these firms, however, they are also less likely to 
engage in these problematic practices in the first place. 
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regulators164 may be sufficient to successfully enact this Article’s 
proposed reform; punishing only even the most egregious of conduct 
may be enough to solve the underlying problem—so long, of course, 
as the word gets out. 
B.  Deterring Only Unethical Vioxx Agreements 
Ensuring that it is predominantly unethical behavior that is 
deterred is, unfortunately, somewhat more challenging. Not every 
aggrieved plaintiffs’ claim should become a publicity spectacle, nor 
should every ethics complaint be prosecuted; there are many 
excellent plaintiffs’ lawyers who do consistently act in their clients’ 
best interests. Blindly punishing those who engage in non-class mass 
settlements will stifle creativity among even well-meaning lawyers, 
potentially bringing mass settlement to a halt in the context of mass 
torts. 
So when and where should regulators act? Which mass tort 
settlement agreement terms and what lawyer behaviors should raise 
the hackles of potential regulators? This is no easy question, and the 
subtleties of its answer must ultimately be played out on a case-by-
case basis by ethics regulators. Fortunately, Rule 23 presents a handy 
guide as to what constitutes a fair settlement structure, and it may 
serve, at least, as a starting framework for potential regulators 
rooting out problematic settlement terms. As this Article extensively 
discussed in Part II, Rule 23 carefully balances the involved parties’ 
interests in efficiency, fairness, and finality together with society’s 
interest in deterring future accidents. 
Should defendants be permitted to craft a non-class action 
aggregate settlement “class” that includes a small number of strong 
claims with a predominantly weak “class” that defines the recovery 
(in violation of Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement), the result 
will be a settlement that is both unfair to those plaintiffs with 
stronger claims and insufficient to properly deter future mass torts.165 
This same injustice could result if such a “class” included named 
plaintiffs whose claims were atypical of the “class” as a whole (in 
 
 164. See supra Parts IV, V.A, for a discussion of the ethical violations inherent in Vioxx 
Agreements. 
 165. See supra Part IV. 
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violation of Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement).166 And, in 
addition to the already-discussed risk of “sweetheart” deals 
propagating in the absence of judicial oversight over plaintiffs’ 
lawyers,167 agreements that elevate less-competent plaintiffs’ lawyers 
to the position of lead counsel for the purposes of attaining 
defendant-favorable terms (in violation of Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy 
of representation requirement) could similarly result in smaller total 
settlements and less overall deterrence. Potential regulators should 
therefore be very suspicious of any proposed non-class aggregate 
settlement with terms that would not pass scrutiny under Rule 
23(a).168 
But most troubling would be agreements made in violation of 
Rule 23(b). Rule 23(b) restricts no-opt-out classes to a very 
particular set of circumstances and is therefore especially critical to 
ensuring fairness in non-class mass settlements.169 If settlement 
groups best described by 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(3) (both of which permit 
opt-outs) are effectively prohibited from opting out from the 
agreement—as was the case for the Vioxx Agreement170—smaller 
settlements and substantial injustice could result. Particular scrutiny 
should be devoted to these so-called “Vioxx Agreements”: non-class 
aggregate settlements that seek to prevent opting-out in 
circumstances where injunctive relief is not sought. 
One final characteristic that should prompt scrutiny is an 
agreement’s lack of meaningful neutral third-party oversight to the 
settlement (thereby implicitly violating any of the numerous 
provisions in Rule 23 indicating that oversight and enforcement is 
provided by “the court”). As obviously problematic as this may 
seem, it would not even be unprecedented: for example, BP placed 
its own employee in the role of the “neutral” arbiter in disbursing the 
Gulf Coast Claims Facility funds following the Deepwater Horizon 
spill.171 There are many different forms that such a problematic 
 
 166. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 167. See supra Part II.B; see also Coffee, supra note 8, at 883 (discussing the implications of 
“sweetheart” settlements). 
 168. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 169. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 170. See supra Part II.C.2. For a discussion of the Vioxx Agreement’s “all or nothing” clause, 
see, supra Parts IV.A, IV.B. 
 171. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as a 
Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims, 71 LA. L. REV. 819, 838 (2011) (describing many of the 
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characteristic of an agreement could take, but ethics regulators would 
be well-advised to look closely at any agreement made and disbursed 
outside of the supervision of a neutral arbiter who effectively 
possessed most of a judge’s tools for ensuring fairness. 
So long as potential ethics regulators reserve sanction for those 
agreements that fail to adhere to Rule 23’s guidelines, sanctioning 
would-be crafters of the next Vioxx Agreement will prevent abuse of 
non-class mass settlements without stifling settlement altogether. 
Thus, sanctions and the free market can fill the need for fair and 
adequate mass settlement where Rule 23 class actions are no longer 
permitted or appropriate. 
C.  Finding Accountability’s Administrators 
Having described what will deter untoward Vioxx Agreements, 
and when and where deterrence should be applied, this Article 
completes its analysis of how to defer Vioxx Agreements by 
exploring who these regulators should be. There are two primary 
challenges to effective ethics regulation in such a context: (1) 
identifying effective ethics regulators, and (2) motivating these 
regulators to actually regulate. Entire law review articles have been 
devoted to the topic of ethics enforcement. This Article will therefore 
not attempt to provide a comprehensive map to ethics reform—that 
must be the subject of a different article—but will rather briefly 
outline who could feasibly regulate Vioxx Agreements. 
1.  Who Are the Ethics Regulators? 
The lax enforcement of ethics rules is a widely known and well-
discussed problem.172 State ethics committees were tasked with 
enforcing the rules implicated by the Vioxx Agreement itself, and yet 
did little to insist on strict ethical compliance. Fortunately, ethics 
committees are not the only entities with the knowledge, motivation, 
or authority to uphold the ethical practice of law; judges, too, can be 
ethics regulators. Unfortunately, judges also are reluctant arbiters of 
 
problems underlying the structure of the Deepwater Horizon claims resolution process, including 
Kenneth Feinberg’s disputed “neutral” role as Master of this fund). 
 172. See, e.g., Richard G. Johnson, Integrating Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibility 
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 819, 825–26 (2004); Patrick J. 
Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral 
Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705, 707 (1998). 
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ethics violations and act infrequently in the face of potentially 
sanctionable or referable conduct. There is a third potential means by 
which ethics regulation may be achieved: if breaking ethical rules is 
a bad business proposition, lawyers will self-regulate. Thus, the 
public at-large, through the influence it exerts on prospective clients, 
provides some regulating force on plaintiffs lawyers. 
There are a number of explanations for why effective ethics 
regulation does not currently spring from any of these sources.173 
Two primary reasons for this non-regulation, each implicated by 
Vioxx Agreements, are precedent and transparency. First, judges and 
ethics committees are predominantly lawyers, and are therefore 
trained to defer to precedent. Even though ethics precedent is 
generally not binding, judges and committees are lax ethics enforcers 
because—in part—lax enforcement is the norm.174 Neither judges 
nor ethics committees wish to be accused of inconsistency or 
favoritism in their enforcement, and the rare use of sanctions has 
rendered what should be a regular practice an exception instead. 
Second is the transparency problem: ethics committees can only 
discipline infractions that are brought to their attention. As the 
academic literature has recognized, a substantial obstacle to ethics 
enforcement is the identification of potential violators: “Only after 
the identification function is improved are prosecutorial and 
adjudicatory procedures and policies of primary importance. Without 
adequate information input, the system cannot attend to, because it 
does not know about, the majority of instances of lawyers’ 
misconduct.”175 Consequently, a lack of transparency regarding 
potential rules-breaking will hamper the effective regulation of ethics 
rules. 
 
 173. At least, in general. Some judges and ethics committees are, of course, stricter than 
others. 
 174. See Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal 
Ethics—I. Origins, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 469, 470 (2001) (describing the absence of 
regulation that has defined the majority of the practice of law). 
 175. Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients and Professional Regulation, 
1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 917, 1005 (1976); see also AM. BAR ASS’N SPECIAL COMM. ON 
EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN 
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 168 (1970) (discussing the problems caused by the failure of 
attorneys and judges to report misconduct); E. Wayne Thode, The Duty of Lawyers and Judges to 
Report Other Lawyers’ Breaches of the Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 95 
(1976); Donald T. Weckstein, Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession, 
48 TEX. L. REV. 267, 282 (1970). 
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Ethics committees primarily receive information regarding 
ethics violations from three sources: (1) the lawyers’ clients, (2) the 
public, or (3) another lawyer.176 Of these sources, lawyers’ clients—
usually plaintiffs—contribute a substantial proportion, if not an 
outright majority, of all ethics references.177 Unfortunately, although 
references from plaintiffs are key to ethics committees, plaintiffs 
often understand little about the law, their case, or their lawyers, and 
are therefore rarely empowered to demand change.178 And because 
class action lawyers typically solicit potential plaintiffs, and not vice-
versa, market pressures from discerning plaintiffs are only a weak 
influence on lawyer behavior.179 Similarly, neither the public at-large 
nor other lawyers constitute a significant check against unethical 
behavior. The public usually lacks both the knowledge and the will 
to refer violating lawyers to ethics committees.180 And lawyers 
generally choose not to report potential ethics violations: lawyers are 
uniquely able to “rationalize a breach as less than substantial by 
some defensible theory,”181 have a sense of solidarity with their 
colleagues on the bar,182 and are influenced by society’s 
stigmatization of whistleblowers.183 Thus, very little pressure 
currently exists to regulate potential ethics violators. But fortunately, 
as will be discussed, there are several parties who are in a strong 
position to monitor Vioxx Agreements. 
2.  How Do We Motivate Regulators to Regulate? 
These obstacles present a practical problem for this Article’s 
normative proposal; that strict ethics enforcement is advantageous 
 
 176. John Levy, The Judge’s Role in the Enforcement of Ethics—Fear and Learning in the 
Profession, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 103 (1982). Levy also discusses a fourth potential 
avenue of reference: some sort of legal professional law enforcement. However, as there is 
currently no ethics police, this final avenue for ethics references will be tabled for the remainder 
of the present Article; although an ethics police could be an ideal means of (un)ethical references 
of Vioxx Arrangements, it remains strictly hypothetical. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See id. 
 179. Coffee, supra note 8, at 886. 
 180. Levy, supra note 176, at 103. 
 181. “In common parlance and even in law review articles, pejorative terms such as ‘squeal,’ 
‘rat,’ ‘stool pigeon,’ and ‘gestapo’ are used freely.” Id. at 104–05 (noting also that “The Clark 
Report found ‘outright hostility’ from the practicing bar toward disciplinary enforcement”). 
 182. Levy, supra note 176, at 104. 
 183. Id. 
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does not necessarily mean it is feasible. But all hope is not lost! The 
novel structure of Vioxx Agreements mitigates at least some of the 
existing major bars to effective ethics regulation. This Article does 
not propose that the structure of such Agreements, alone, subjects 
Agreements to sufficient regulation: as the Vioxx Agreement itself 
demonstrates, the market is not currently self-regulating. Rather, as 
this section explains, the reforms proposed in this Article are 
attainable, should motivated regulators or public interest groups 
desire to purse such change. 
First, the novelty of Vioxx Agreements should diminish the 
limiting effect precedent has on effective ethics regulation. The 
emergence of a new category of settlement presents an opportunity 
for ethics regulators—whether they are ethics committees or 
judges—to engage anew. There has not yet been a sufficient 
propagation of Vioxx Agreements for either precedent or reputation 
to develop, so regulators may regulate Vioxx Agreements without 
feeling that they are disregarding precedent or fearing that they will 
be accused of inconsistency or favoritism. 
Second, the unusual and novel structure of Vioxx Agreements 
should attract greater scrutiny from ethics committees, judges, other 
members of the bar, the public at large, and even the claimants 
themselves. The information limitation on regulators’ ability to 
regulate, therefore, will be less of a bar to ethics scrutiny in the 
context of Vioxx Agreements than it might be in other contexts; 
regulating lawyers and judges will be more predisposed to suspicion 
of these unusual settlements than more staid forms of settlement, and 
will presumably hesitate less to refer potential violators for sanction. 
The public, in turn, is more likely to be engaged, as the novel legal 
structures applied should attract greater press attention184—although 
engagement from uninvolved parties is likely to remain low. Finally, 
the mass nature of these settlements effectively guarantees that some 
claimants will believe that they have received the short end of the 
stick. And, especially if ethics regulators become a more involved 
presence in the context of mass settlement, a number of these newly 
 
 184. Soo Yeon Hong, Gatekeeping of News Releases: The Gap Between the Selection and the 
Prominence of News Releases, ALLACADEMIC RES., 1 (2007), available at http://citation 
.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/2/8/6/pages172866/p172866-7.php 
(noting that “unexpectedness” is a major factor in newsworthiness). 
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minted complainants will inevitably find their way to ethics 
committees. 
In fact, many of these effects have already begun to manifest as 
ethics regulators have thus far been relatively, albeit still 
insufficiently, engaged in overseeing novel settlement arrangements. 
State ethics committees have shown an increasing willingness in 
recent years to sanction plaintiffs’ attorneys who abuse their clients’ 
trust in the context of mass tort settlements,185 and judges have 
shown a similarly increased willingness to police plaintiffs’ attorneys 
who do not act in the best interest of their clients.186 A bar of 
attorneys specializing in challenging improper settlements, even, has 
begun to emerge.187 
This is not to say that disciplinary committees or other potential 
regulators are sure to act in this context. What will most likely 
happen is more of the same.188 And the scrutiny currently being 
applied to Vioxx Agreements falls far short of that necessary to 
effectuate the reform proposed in this Article. But this Article is not 
merely descriptive but normative. What should happen is more 
regulation of Vioxx Agreements. And as this Article has described, 
the reaction of lawyers and judges to novel settlements thus far does 
show potential for sufficient reform. Even a single action could get 
regulators’ attention and jump-start the institution of effective 
measures. This could take the form of a high-profile sanction or 
something more unusual—such as a civil suit filed by plaintiffs or 
some federal involvement, such as a criminal prosecution of the 
settling lawyers or an investigation of a settlement agreement by a 
 
 185. See, e.g., Jon Newberry, Stan Chesley “Counsel in Chief” in Fen-Phen, CINCINNATI 
BUS. COURIER (Jun. 17, 2011), http://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/print-edition/2011/03/04 
/stan-chesley-counsel-in-chief-in.html?page=all. 
 186. In fact, it was the threat of judicial action, in part, that likely motivated Judge Fallon’s 
involvement in the Vioxx Agreement. 
 187. See, e.g., Chicago Lawyers for Cases Involving Insufficient Settlements, SCHIFF 
GORMAN LLC, http://www.sgattorneymalpractice.com/Legal-Malpractice-Services/Insufficient 
-Settlements.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2003); Improper Settlement, FLORIDA MALPRACTICE 
LAWS., http://www.sdtriallaw.com/PracticeAreas/Improper-Settlement.asp (last visited Aug. 24, 
2014); LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW., http://www.legal-malpractice-law.com/improper-settlement/ 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2013).  
 188. The track record of disciplinary authorities in other high-stakes areas leaves much to be 
desired; despite the problems that have emerged in corporate practice, for example, authorities 
have done little. 
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consumer protection agency.189 Sufficient regulation is, therefore, 
within reach;190 with some additional will, a sufficient regime of 
sanctions may be enacted. 
D.  Accountability’s Advantages 
Thus far this Article has presented a problem and a solution. In 
closing, it will briefly discuss not merely how this solution should be 
adopted, but why it should. Why is it that sanctioning plaintiffs’ 
lawyers will remedy the problems that have begun to arise from 
Amchem and Ortiz’s restriction of Rule 23 certification? Nearly all of 
the structural problems that arise in the absence of Rule 23’s 
protections are due to breakdowns in plaintiffs’ representation and 
the cross-incentives facing plaintiffs and their attorneys.191 Zealous 
advocacy from the plaintiffs’ bar will close much of the gap between 
those resolutions that are made within the confines of Rule 23 and 
those that are made without.192 
 
 189. See Ted Frank, George Cohen’s Letter to the FTC Re the Vioxx Settlement, 
POINTOFLAW.COM (Jan. 22 2008, 12:11 PM), http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/004680 
.php#4680 (arguing to the FTC that the Vioxx Agreement was an antitrust violation because the 
participating lawyers were effectively conspiring to refuse to represent lawyers who opted out of 
the Agreement). 
 190. As was previously noted, see supra note 160, one other ripe target for regulation may be 
the defense attorneys who propose these problematic arrangements. A sophisticated mass-tort 
defense bar has arisen, and a small number of firms dominate products liability mass-tort defense. 
Even a single sanction or reprimand, therefore, could have a significant impact on the practices of 
these lawyers. Although the legal or ethical obligations of defense lawyers to only participate in 
agreements that preserve the rights of plaintiffs may not be as strong as that of plaintiffs’ lawyers, 
ethical regulators may nevertheless be able to hold defense lawyer drafters of problematic 
agreements responsible. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 361, 388 (2002) (noting that “[d]rafting the instrument effecting the harm is the step beyond 
advice that would expose the lawyer to possible liability for the consequences of misdeeds in 
which he or she actively participated”); Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie of Lawyers’ Ethics in 
Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577, 588 (1975) (noting that lawyers have no right to right or duty to 
assist a client in unconscionable conduct); see also Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and 
Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 686 (1978) (“In measuring the possible 
liability for lawyers who write standard form contracts, it is important to distinguish between 
advising a client that a particular term in a form contract might not be unconscionable and serving 
the client by drafting an unconscionable provision intended to impede enforcement of citizens’ 
rights.”).  
 191. See supra Part IV.B. Defense lawyers are no less responsible for these problems. And as 
has been discussed, sanctions directed at defense lawyers will similarly be effective in curbing 
problematic practices. See supra notes 160, 190. But because defense lawyers’ responsibility may 
not extend to the formal ethical or legal arena, discussion of this Article’s proposal will focus 
primarily on the impact on plaintiffs’ lawyers. 
 192. As has been discussed, sanctioning defense lawyers or state judges would be a similarly 
effective, albeit a more difficult to enact, remedy. See supra note 160. 
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First, plaintiffs’ attorneys will resist the formation of settlement 
classes that hide the claims of strong plaintiffs behind weak or 
unrepresentative named plaintiffs if the price for their lackluster 
representation is disbarment. This will motivate plaintiffs’ lawyers to 
push for the most favorable possible class composition for their 
clients, contributing to a healthy dialogue that will better inform 
supervising judges of the varying interests implicated by the class 
structure. Any lawyer failing to adequately represent her client in this 
manner would risk violating a number of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, including the conflicts of interest rules 
(1.8),193 counselor rules (2.1),194 and the Rules’ general requirement 
of zealous advocacy.195 Rule 23(a) may not be entirely resurrected in 
such non-Rule 23 agreements by the threat of mere sanctions alone, 
but the heart of its protections would be essentially preserved.196 
Second, plaintiffs’ attorneys facing a severe regime of sanctions 
will not hesitate to opt out of agreements unfavorable to their clients’ 
interests. In addition to the Model Rules implicated when Rule 23(a) 
is not applied, plaintiffs’ lawyers who fail to opt their clients out of 
unfavorable settlements that would otherwise fall under Rule 23(b) 
likely violate the rules requiring the exercise of independent 
judgment (2.1) and unrestricted practice (5.6).197 Although the 
heightened requirements of 23(b)(3) could be difficult to replicate 
with sanctions alone, Rule 23(b)’s protections may at least be 
partially organically recreated by ensuring adequate 
representation.198 
Third, the structural oversights provided by 23(e)(2) and (g) that 
prevent attorneys from taking advantage of their clients will be far 
less necessary if there are sanctions motivating faithful advocacy.199 
Rather, an aggressive regime of sanctions would largely—if not 
entirely—supplant any formal protections from the greed of 
 
 193. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 (Discussion Draft 1980). 
 194. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1. 
 195. See, e.g., id. at Preamble. 
 196. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 197. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1, 5.6 (2011). 
 198. See supra Part II.C.2. There will likely remain some issues associated with resolving 
limited-fund settlements where the fund really is limited. Bankruptcy may prove to be a superior 
tool for such circumstances. See Troy McKenzie, Towards a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass 
Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (2012). 
 199. See supra Part II.C.3. 
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plaintiffs’ lawyers. A plaintiff’s lawyer operating in her own best 
interest would not lead her client astray were she faced with a 
reasonable possibility of severe punishment for her actions. 
Fourth, although sanctions may not decrease the use of Vioxx 
Agreements, they could simplify the administration of such private 
arrangements. Faced with a real possibility of discipline, the lawyers 
structuring these agreements will be more likely to follow the tested 
and established guidelines of Rule 23. This will not merely increase 
the equitability and deterrence value of non-Rule 23 settlements, but 
will require judges to come to terms with far fewer novel or creative 
structures. Moreover, plaintiffs’ lawyers will insist on more active 
judicial management of these arrangements, and overseeing judges 
will oblige, preferring their names not be associated with sanctioned 
arrangements. This will therefore simultaneously decrease the strain 
of overseeing novel non-Rule 23 arrangements on the judiciary while 
increasing the judiciary’s ability to effectively manage and police 
those private arrangements. 
In sum, although these changes may not impact the economic 
disadvantages to plaintiffs inherent in the Supreme Court’s limiting 
Rule 23 jurisprudence—since plaintiffs’ threats of litigation and trial 
will continue to have less credibility200—for the reasons described, 
this Article’s proposal will significantly improve our current 
sanction-less world of Vioxx Agreements. Assuring plaintiffs 
adequate representation will go a long way to ameliorating the 
injustices that plaintiffs will otherwise face outside of Rule 23, and it 
will restore much of the deterrence power of group litigation. 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys acting in the best interest of their clients will 
refuse to sign on to agreements that create plaintiff classes that 
disadvantage those participating in a manner prohibited by Rule 
23(a). Similarly, plaintiffs’ attorneys will steer plaintiffs clear of 
class agreements prohibiting opt-outs in situations other than those 
encapsulated by Rule 23(b)(2). Although some deterrence value will 
remain lost, due to the diminished bargaining position of plaintiffs 
who cannot threaten a class action lawsuit, aggressive sanctions 
against plaintiffs’ lawyers will close much of the remaining gap 
between such extra-judicial agreements and Rule 23 settlements. 
 
 200. See discussion supra Part IV, p. 37. 
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This is the lesson learned from the Fen-Phen litigation. In 
Kentucky, before any national class action settlement could be 
negotiated, state courts certified a 400-plaintiff class.201 To avoid the 
prospect of a costly trial, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals negotiated a 
settlement with a number of plaintiffs’ attorneys, agreeing to a $200 
million settlement supervised by a Kentucky judge. The judge, 
however, was too close with the plaintiffs’ attorneys and accepted an 
agreement that gave nearly half of the settlement to just three 
lawyers as attorney fees.202 Ultimately, the judge was disbarred and 
two of the attorneys were convicted of defrauding their clients.203 
Although the Kentucky Fen-Phen settlement may have been a 
failure, the message it sent to attorneys was clear: settle in your own 
interests at your own peril.204 Thus, the Fen-Phen failed settlement 
was a sweeping success for the management of a just judiciary. But 
even more aggressive management of lawyers is necessary in the 
context of non-Rule 23 mass settlements, not merely due to the 
possibility of ethical transgressions, but due to the inevitable impact 
that the loss of Rule 23’s protections will have on the deterrence 
value of mass settlements outside of the formal class action 
framework. 
Fortunately, inadequacies in representation need not rise to the 
level seen in the Fen-Phen litigation before sanctions may be used; 
jurisdictions seeking to crack down on under-deterring Vioxx 
Agreements do not need to look far to find attorney ethical 
violations. The Vioxx Agreement was remarkably well-crafted yet, 
as previously discussed, it implicated Rules 1.16(b), 1.2(a), 2.1, and 
5.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.205 Other privately 
crafted agreements will likely implicate additional ethical rules.206 
 
 201. Joe Tort, Kentucky Fen-Phen Lawyers Given Long Prison Sentences, MASS TORT LITIG. 
BLOG (Aug. 18, 2009), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mass_tort_litigation/2009/08/kentucky 
-fenphen-lawyers-given-long-prison-sentences.html. 
 202. Debra Cassens Weiss, Former Judge Disbarred for Approving Fen-Phen Settlement 
Without Checking the Details, ABA J. (Oct. 28, 2011, 9:43 AM), http://www.abajournal.com 
/news/article/former_judge_disbarred_for_approving_fen-phen_settlement_without_checking_t/. 
 203. Id. 
 204. David G. Arganian, The Cautionary Tale of Plaintiffs Attorney Stan Chelsey, L. OFFS. OF 
DAVID ARGANIAN, http://dwi-counsel.com/news/21.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2012) (describing 
how one of the disbarred attorneys has long been a controversial figure in the mass-tort world due 
to his predilection for “elbow[ing] his way into cases and then settl[ing] them too early”). 
 205. See supra Part IV. 
 206. Such as MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7, 1.8, and 5.4—as discussed above. 
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By seeking significant sanctions as well as disbarment for ethical 
violations, localities would go a long way toward discouraging 
lawyers from contracting with defendants in ways adverse to their 
clients’ interests, a practice that could even itself be barred outright. 
This solution will allow Vioxx Agreements to continue to meet the 
needs of group litigation—curtailing extrajudicial group dispute 
resolution will leave plaintiffs’ injuries unremunerated and 
defendants unable to ensure finality, and will produce negative 
societal externalities207—without substantially sacrificing group 
litigation’s deterrence value. By ensuring that the hard-working and 
creative attorneys crafting these agreements adhere to the spirit of 
Rule 23, the threat of sanctions will facilitate non-class mass 
settlements in the free market that match, or even exceed, Rule 23 in 
protecting the various interests of defendants, plaintiffs, and society. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As the Supreme Court takes ever more restrictive positions with 
respect to Rule 23 class certification, mass tort settlements will 
continue to move toward private contractual arrangements like the 
Vioxx Agreement. Ironically, although Amchem and Ortiz 
represented an unequivocal victory for proceduralists, the emergence 
of Vioxx Agreements in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Rule 
23 jurisprudence will do far more procedural damage than the pre-
Amchem and Ortiz jurisprudence ever could.208 Although ensuring a 
healthy settlement class without triggering obvious ethical objections 
will generally entail the involvement of judges in some capacity, 
judicial oversight of these private agreements will not as rigorously 
protect plaintiffs as Rule 23 and CAFA currently do. This is not to 
say that these regulations effectuate good, or even adequate, 
protection, but rather that Vioxx Agreements will offer even less. 
The primary result of this will be the systemic under-deterrence of 
future harm resulting, in large part, from the inadequate 
representation of plaintiffs—an unfortunate consequence of 
insufficient judicial oversight and the elimination of Rules 23(a)(4), 
(e)(2), and (g). Therefore, the market has provided a solution to mass 
torts’ loss of Rule 23, but it is a solution that itself must be cured. 
 
 207. See supra Part II. 
 208. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 14, at 1926–27. 
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Although a complete revision of Rule 23 could resolve this 
dangerous consequence of Amchem and Ortiz, a far simpler solution 
would be to enforce sanctions against those plaintiffs’ lawyers who 
fail to sufficiently protect classes in non-Rule 23 group settlements. 
State bar associations, ethics boards, and judges can and should act 
assertively to prevent inadequate representation and oversight in the 
non-Rule 23 settlements that will proliferate in the aftermath of 
Amchem and Ortiz. 
 
